Nuclear Weapons
and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
Troubling Scenarios
Ash Jain
Policy Focus #114 | August 2011

Nuclear Weapons
and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
Troubling Scenarios
Ash Jain
Policy Focus #114 | Augus
ion
Front cover: Iran¡¦s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and a group of Revolutionary Guard commanders at a gathering
of Basij paramilitary forces in Tehran, November 2007. (AP Photo)
Contents
About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Iran¡¦s Worldview and Strategic Aspirations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Iran as a Nuclear Weapons State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Scenario 1: Iran pressures Gulf states to reduce or end the U.S. mlitary presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Scenario 2: Iran establishes a defense partnership with Iraq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Scenario 3: Iran extends its nuclear umbrella to encompass Hizballah and Hamas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Scenario 4: Iran and Venezuela expand strategic cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Scenario 5: Iran facilitates terrorist attacks against the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. U.S. Policy Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v
About the Author
Ash Jain , a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute, served as a member of the State Department¡¦s Policy Planning
Staff from 2004 to 2010 and provided counsel to U.S. officials on the strategic challenges posed by Iran and
other actors. He also served as a special advisor with the department¡¦s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation,
examining policy options for addressing Tehran¡¦s nuclear program. Previously, he worked as counsel
for the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and as an adjunct professor of constitutional law and politics
at George Washington University. A veteran analyst who has provided commentary for media outlets such as Fox
News, BBC, NPR, Canadian Broadcasting, and the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Jain holds a law degree and a master of
science in foreign service from Georgetown University.
n n n
The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy vii
Acknowledgments
This paper benefiteD greatly from the insights and advice of a number of my colleagues at The
Washington Institute. I would especially like to thank Robert Satloff, Patrick Clawson, and Michael Eisenstadt
for their invaluable input and support, as well as research intern Andrew Smith, editor Jason Warshof, and
executive editor Mary Kalbach Horan for their contributions. Finally, I would like to extend a special note of
appreciation to research intern Cobi Gantz, without whose time, hard work, and dedication this project could
not have been completed.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ix
Executive Summary
Iran¡¦s regional objectives. Given Iran¡¦s relatively limited
global influence, its far-reaching aspirations may
come across as fanciful and perhaps even delusional.
However, these global objectives provide inspiration
for Iranian power projection within its own region,
where the country¡¦s influence is more pronounced.
Iran appears to be focused primarily on three regional
objectives: (1) building Gulf Arab support for Iran¡¦s
interests, (2) supporting the emergence of pro-Iranian
governments in Iraq and Lebanon, and (3) challenging
Israel¡¦s existence.
Despite its grand ambitions, Tehran faces significant
constraints. On a global scale, Iran lacks the economic
and military might to challenge U.S. power. Within
its own region, considerable obstacles hinder Iran¡¦s
efforts to counter U.S. influence. Domestically, too, the
Iranian regime continues to face widespread unrest.
Yet, emboldened by a powerful military and security
apparatus, and guided by a sense of ¡§manifest destiny,¡¨
Iran remains determined to challenge U.S. leadership
around the world. The acquisition of a nuclear weapons
capability could allow Tehran to enhance its influence
in meaningful and significant ways.
Iranian Nuclear Scenarios
ƒô Scenario 1: Iran pressures Gulf states to reduce
or end the U.S. military presence. Iran¡¦s acquisition
of nuclear arms is likely to prompt Gulf states to seek
stronger defensive measures against Iran and, possibly,
protection under a U.S. nuclear umbrella. Alternatively,
some states¡Xindependently or under the auspices of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)¡Xmight seek
to establish their own nuclear weapons deterrent.
However, while potentially effective in deterring direct
Iranian aggression, such measures may be of limited
value in preventing Iran from engaging in certain types
of asymmetric or subversive activities. For example,
shielded by a nuclear capability, Iran could seek to initiate
disputes over the extraction of oil and gas reserves,
funnel assistance to Shiite extremists, and engage in
plausibly deniable terrorist attacks.
The implications of a nuclear Iran have
been much debated among policy analysts. This
study explores how a nuclear-capable Iran might
use its nuclear status to advance its interests and
objectives. It outlines five scenarios that focus on
areas where Iran has been actively engaged in its
own region and beyond: the Gulf, Iraq, the Levant,
Latin America, and, more broadly, terrorist activity
directed against the United States. The analysis
describes potentially realistic and specific ways in
which a nuclear-capable Iran might seek to project
power and influence through means that are beyond
its power today. The intention is not to suggest
that Iran is certain or even likely to act in the ways
described; rather, it is to illustrate the risks and consequences
to American strategic interests of the possible
acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by
a regime determined to advance its long-term strategic
objectives.
Iran¡¦s Worldview
and Strategic Aspiratons
The motivations of the Islamic Republic have been
the subject of much speculation. But based on Iranian
activities on the ground and statements by regime officials
themselves, it is possible to make some informed
judgments about Iran¡¦s strategic aspirations.
Iran¡¦s global ambitions. Despite struggles over power
and authority, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President
Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad appear to share an
underlying worldview that motivates their approach
to foreign policy. This worldview is marked by three
broad themes: (1) Western liberal democracy and
capitalism are failed concepts that are destined to
collapse; (2) the United States is an illegitimate regime,
driven by imperialistic and materialistic impulses that
will lead to its ultimate decline; and (3) Iran¡¦s mission
is to replace the current international order with
a new paradigm grounded in the ideals of the Islamic
Revolution.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
x Policy Focus #114
ƒô Scenario 3: Iran extends its nuclear umbrella
to encompass Hizballah and Hamas. Buoyed by its
nuclear weapons capability, Iran¡¦s leaders might look
to extend an implicit nuclear umbrella to Hizballah
and Hamas. Such an action could mean that a military
conflict between Israel and either group could
escalate into direct conflict with Iran, forcing Israel
to act with greater caution in initiating preemptive or
retaliatory strikes against its adversaries. Protected by
a nuclear deterrent, Iran or Syria might also seek to
transfer increasingly sophisticated weapons to Hizballah
or Hamas, including, at some point, radiological
dispersion devices (or ¡§dirty bombs¡¨) or possibly even
chemical weapons. The net effect of a more restrained
Israel is that, over time, Hizballah and Hamas would
continue to enhance the strength, sophistication, and
accuracy of their military arsenals, potentially diminishing
the overwhelming military advantage that Israel
enjoys today.
While mutual deterrence between Iran and Israel
may prevent conflict for some time, the Israelis may
find themselves increasingly on the defensive against an
enemy that is willing to directly target civilians and risk
greater civilian casualties on its own side as it pursues
its ideological aims¡Xleading to a bloodier and more
destructive outcome the next time Iran or its proxies
decide to provoke a conflict. Another potential impact
of Iran¡¦s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is
the strengthened popular appeal of the resistance cause
in the Arab world. Such a shift would allow Hizballah
to further consolidate political power in Lebanon
and Hamas to gain greater political support among
Palestinians.
ƒô Scenario 4: Iran and Venezuela expand strategic
cooperation. Iran has been seeking to expand its growing
network of anti-Western regimes in different parts
of the world, and has in recent years solidified relationships
with several countries in Latin America, particularly
Venezuela. Although the nature of the relationship
between Iran and Venezuela is unclear, the two countries
have established a strategic partnership aimed at
challenging U.S. ¡§imperialism¡¨ and appear to be moving
toward cooperation in the security arena. Despite their
Gulf efforts to contain and deter Iran could escalate
tensions in the region and increase the risk of violence
and conflict. Over time, one or more Gulf states
might attempt to reduce tensions by seeking ways to
accommodate and appease Tehran¡Xat least on issues
not considered vital to their security. One means of
accommodation could involve reducing or eliminating
the U.S. military presence in their countries, as Tehran
has long demanded, making it difficult for the United
States to provide a robust deterrent posture against a
more assertive, nuclear-capable Iran. Gulf states might
also feel compelled to draw down their support for
moderate political actors in the region or parrot the
Iranian line with regard to oil production quotas from
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).
ƒô Scenario 2: Iran establishes a defense partnership
with Iraq. Iran¡¦s efforts to influence political developments
in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein
have produced mixed results. Nevertheless, by leveraging
the enhanced psychological benefits it would
likely derive from a nuclear weapons capability, Iran
might intensify efforts to reinforce Iraq¡¦s inclination
to accommodate Tehran. A future Iraqi government¡X
under pressure from a nuclear-capable Iran¡Xmay feel
increasingly compelled to appease Tehran by not only
requiring the withdrawal of all remaining American
combat troops, but also limiting any future U.S. training
role. Iraq might also scale back or cancel plans for
weapons purchases from the United States, further
reducing U.S. political leverage.
Similarly, the Iraqi government, under heightened
pressure to accommodate Iran, could align itself more
closely with Tehran on regional and international
issues. If radical Shiite groups, such as the Sadr Movement,
succeed in obtaining greater control over a
future Iraqi government, Iraq might find itself pressured
to establish greater security and defensive cooperation
efforts, including, for example, through joint
military exercises and other initiatives. At some point,
Iraq may also feel compelled to turn to Iran¡Xas well
as suppliers such as Russia and China¡Xfor weapons
purchases.
Executive Summary Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy xi
ships suspected of carrying illicit materials; preventing
fuel supplies to Iranian aircraft; maintaining military
assistance to Egypt, Israel, or the Gulf states; or engaging
in military intervention in a place that Iran deems
objectionable. Faced with credible Iranian terrorist
threats, U.S. officials could be compelled to reconsider
the risks involved in taking action that could provoke
an Iranian response.
Policy Implications
While the outcomes described by these scenarios are by
no means certain, or perhaps even likely, they illustrate
the risks and uncertainties facing the United States if
Iran were able to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
If any one of these outcomes were to result, it could
significantly complicate U.S. interests.
Given the Islamic Republic¡¦s far-reaching ambitions,
a nuclear weapons capability¡Xcoupled with its existing
hard and soft power assets¡Xcould have profound
implications:
Iran does not appear to be seeking ¡½¡½ a direct military
confrontation with its adversaries¡Xand unless facing
an imminent threat to its survival, the regime
appears unlikely to attack an adversary using nuclear
weapons. Rather, Iran would more likely use a
nuclear capability in a manner consistent with its
longstanding pattern of behavior¡Xto demoralize its
adversaries through subtle intimidation and power
projection.
¡½¡½ Perceived as a rising, hegemonic force in the Middle
East, Iran could use a nuclear capability to enhance
its political leverage over its adversaries in the region.
Faced with subtle forms of intimidation, Iran¡¦s Gulf
neighbors, including Iraq, might feel increasingly
compelled to appease Iran and accommodate its
interests in ways that could be detrimental to the
United States.
¡½¡½ A nuclear-capable Iran could help strengthen and
expand the Iran-led resistance front across the Middle
East¡Xraising its public stature and reinforcing
the expanding power and influence wielded by Iran¡¦s
eagerness to showcase an anti-American front, Iran and
Venezuela make for somewhat strange bedfellows. But
if their commitment to cooperate remains strong, the
Iran-Venezuela axis, backed by Iranian nuclear weapons,
could have serious consequences for the United States.
For example, a nuclear weapons capability could
allow Tehran to heighten its support for its terrorist
contacts, with Venezuela emerging as a safe haven for
Iran-backed terrorist groups seeking to threaten the
United States. In addition, Iran might be willing to risk
transferring increasingly lethal and sophisticated weapons
systems to Venezuela, including ballistic missiles. It
is also possible that Iran might one day be prepared to
transfer sensitive nuclear technology and, though perhaps
unlikely in the near term, even nuclear weapons
to Venezuela. An emboldened Venezuela, backed by a
nuclear Iran, could stoke instability in Latin America
by using its newfound political and military influence
to expand its ¡§Bolivarian Revolution¡¨ and help consolidate
Iran¡¦s anti-Western alliance.
ƒô Scenario 5: Iran facilitates terrorist attacks
against the United States. Iran remains the world¡¦s
¡§most active state sponsor of terrorism,¡¨ and its terrorist
capabilities¡Xboth regionally and globally¡Xare
formidable. Although, apart from Iraq and Afghanistan,
Tehran has in recent years avoided direct attacks
against the United States, Iranian leaders might reasonably
conclude that nuclear capability would shield the
Islamic Republic from direct military retaliation, thus
allowing it to expand its use of terrorism. To be sure,
attacks against core U.S. interests that could be traced
directly back to Iran would likely provoke some form
of retaliation against Iranian interests. But nuclear
weapons in the possession of rogue regimes have historically
served as an effective military deterrent.
Terrorist attacks targeting U.S. interests at home
or around the world could not only result in injury or
death to significant numbers of Americans, but also
constrain U.S. freedom of action. Having deterred the
United States from using military force to prevent its
nuclear acquisition, Iran might feel empowered to use
terrorism to deter other U.S. actions that it opposes.
This could include, for example, interdicting Iranian
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
xii Policy Focus #114
allies in key states, including Lebanon, the Palestinian
territories, and Iraq.
By raising the risks and ¡½¡½ costs associated with potential
retaliatory strikes, an Iranian nuclear weapons
capability could allow Tehran to transfer increasingly
advanced weapons systems to its terrorist allies
in the Levant¡Xenhancing these allies¡¦ asymmetric
capabilities and, over time, eroding the overwhelming
military advantage thus far enjoyed by Israel.
Iran might also be prepared to transfer ballistic
missiles and sensitive nuclear technology to rogue
regimes around the world¡Xparticularly in Latin
America¡Xthat share its anti-American and antiimperialist
worldview.
¡½¡½ A nuclear-ready Iran could limit U.S. freedom of
action in meaningful ways. Once Iran crosses the
nuclear threshold, it will have gained a significant
instrument of leverage that could permanently foreclose
certain U.S. options in dealing with Iran. As a
result, the United States could be forced to tolerate
greater acts of Iranian-sponsored violence and terrorism
in the Middle East and beyond.
¡½¡½ Deterrence and containment of a nuclear-ready Iran
could prove difficult, complicated, costly, and potentially
ineffective. With its own nuclear deterrent, and
through the extension of security guarantees, the
United States might succeed in deterring Iran¡¦s use of
nuclear weapons, as well as direct military aggression
against its allies. But preventing increasingly lethal
arms transfers, asymmetric violence, intimidation,
terrorism, and subversion¡Xall Iran¡¦s strengths¡X
could pose a much greater challenge.
For the United States and its allies, preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability must
remain a top priority. Ongoing sabotage operations
could help delay Iranian nuclear progress, but the
results of such efforts may be short-lived. Beyond this,
stemming Iran¡¦s nuclear activities will likely require
increasingly intrusive and politically difficult measures.
But garnering domestic and diplomatic support for
stronger international sanctions¡Xon, for example, Iranian
oil exports¡Xwill be a heavy lift. At some point,
the costs and risks of more coercive options¡Xincluding
military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities¡X
may have to be weighed against the costs and risks of
allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear capability.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1
1 | Introduction
Others suggest that these threats have been grossly
exaggerated. According to this view, even if Tehran
gained a short-term psychological boost from
achieving a nuclear weapons capability, the overall
impact on the region would not be overly dramatic.
Iran would still find itself constrained in its ability
to achieve its hegemonic ambitions, confront Israel,
or expand its influence in a Sunni-dominated Middle
East.5 Moreover, a nuclear Iran could be effectively
deterred and contained by the United States and
its regional allies, just as the Soviet Union was during
the Cold War. In a recent Foreign Affairs article,
James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh describe the potential
limitations of a nuclear Iran:6
Going nuclear would empower Iran, but far less than
Tehran hopes¡KAny efforts to destabilize their Sunni
neighbors would meet the same unsuccessful fate as
have similar campaigns in the past¡KParadoxically, a
weapon designed to ensure Iran¡¦s regional preeminence
could further alienate it from its neighbors and
prolong indefinitely the presence of U.S. troops on
its periphery. In other words, nuclear empowerment
could well thwart Iran¡¦s hegemonic ambitions.
Clearly, a nuclear Iran would add another layer of
complexity to an already complicated region. But
given the opaque nature of the regime¡¦s decisionmaking,
it is difficult to predict with any certainty how Iranian
behavior would be impacted by a nuclear weapons
capability. The purpose of this analysis is to explore
various scenarios in which Iran might try to use its
nuclear status to advance its interest and objectives.
The scenarios that follow focus on the five areas where
Iran has been actively engaged within its own region
and beyond: the Gulf, Iraq, the Levant, Latin America,
and terrorist activity directed against the United States
more broadly.
This study describes potentially realistic and specific
ways in which a nuclear-capable Iran might seek
to project power and influence through means that
are beyond its power today. The intention is not to
suggest that Iran is certain or even likely to act in the
While the world¡¦s attention has been
focused on the wave of pro-democracy uprisings taking
place across the Middle East, the Islamic Republic
of Iran has continued to make gradual but significant
progress in its nuclear program. Despite technical setbacks,
Iran has increased the number of centrifuges
operating at full capacity to over 5,000, and has now
amassed enough low-enriched uranium to develop
several nuclear weapons.1 In addition, according to
U.S. and British officials, Iran has likely resumed work
on nuclear weapons design2 and carried out covert
tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.3
The implications of a nuclear Iran have been the
subject of much debate among policy analysts. Many
contend that a nuclear-capable Iran would constitute
a dangerous development, unleashing a cascade of proliferation
in a region already roiled in extremism and
unrest. Armed with a nuclear capability, Iran would
behave more aggressively: subverting and intimidating
its neighbors or perhaps even risking a nuclear confrontation
in an ideologically driven quest for regional
domination. A 2009 Washington Institute Presidential
Task Force Report4 outlined some of the potential
risks of a nuclear-armed Iran:
In the hands of the Tehran regime, an actual nuclear
weapon or the capacity to produce one quickly could
profoundly destabilize the region. Given the past
behavior of Iranian radicals, Iran on the nuclear brink
could exacerbate fears among Gulf Arab states of sabotage
and subversion, particularly across the Sunni-
Shiite divide¡KIran¡¦s threats and actions could push oil
prices up and intimidate its Gulf neighbors to bend
to its will on issues ranging from border disputes
to
the presence of third-party military bases throughout
the Gulf. Beyond the Gulf, radical groups in
Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, all allies of Iran, would be
emboldened by Iranian nuclear progress¡KShielded by
a nuclear deterrent, Iran might be emboldened to step
up its support to terrorist groups. In the worst case,
Iran might share its technology and nuclear material
with its radical friends.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
2 Policy Focus #114
possible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability
by a regime determined to advance its long-term strategic
objectives.
ways described. Rather, it is to illustrate¡Xthrough
reasonably plausible scenarios¡Xthe risks and consequences
to American strategic interests of the
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 3
2 | Iran¡¦s Worldview and Strategic Aspirations
world leaders, speeches before the United Nations, and
remarks and statements at home and abroad, Ahmadinezhad,
who often sets the tone of Iran¡¦s foreign policy,
has offered an often reflective and intellectual narrative
that provides insight into the far-reaching nature of the
regime¡¦s long-term strategic ambitions.
Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
Despite ongoing struggles over power and authority,
Khamenei and Ahmadinezhad appear to share an ideological
worldview that motivates their fundamental
approach to foreign policy. This ideology is marked by
three broad themes:
1. Western liberal democracy and capitalism
are failed concepts that are destined to collapse.
Both Khamenei and Ahmadinezhad have consistently
expressed the view that liberalism and capitalism are
responsible for the ills plaguing humanity today, a philosophy
that, according to Ahmadinezhad, has ¡§produced
nothing but frustration, disappointment and a
dark future¡¨ for humanity.10 On another occasion, he
wrote: ¡§Liberalism and Western style democracy have
not been able to realize the ideals of humanity. Today,
these two concepts have failed. Those with insight can
already hear the sounds of the shattering and fall of the
ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems.¡¨
11 In his mind, these failed visions have resulted
in the range of sociological conditions facing the West,
including inequality, oppression, illicit drugs, poverty
and ¡§social gaps.¡¨12
In an address to the UN, Ahmadinezhad elaborated
that driven by the ¡§predominance of its materialistic
interests,¡¨ liberalism can be sustained only by spreading
inequality and a need to ¡§bring the entire world under its
control and impose its will on other nations.¡¨13 Ahmadinezhad
has gone further to explain the linkage between
capitalism and the West¡¦s interference in other nations:
Presently the existing global structures are based on
materialistic philosophy. According to [this] philosophy,
full diminution [sic] over all the world affairs
An assessment of the potential consequences
of nuclear capability depends to a large extent on
one¡¦s interpretation of Iran¡¦s foreign policy objectives.
Nuclear weapons under the control of an essentially
pragmatic regime, driven primarily by a desire to protect
and deter outside attack, would present a very
different circumstance from that of an ideologically
oriented regime seeking to expand its global influence.
While the motives for Iran¡¦s behavior have been
the subject of much speculation, it is possible to make
some informed judgments about the country¡¦s strategic
aspirations.
Some analysts suggest that despite Tehran¡¦s sometimes
charged rhetoric, the revolutionary fervor that
marked the early days of the Islamic Revolution has
been supplanted by a largely pragmatic and defenseoriented
national security orientation.7 Despite seeking
to enhance its regional influence commensurate
with its size, power, and historical role, Iran¡¦s primary
motivation¡Xit is suggested¡Xis to ensure that no outside
power can threaten its survival. Proponents of this
view maintain that Iran¡¦s buildup of conventional and
asymmetric military capabilities, as well as its support
for militant groups across the region, are not aimed
at undermining regional security, but at deterring
and preventing hostile actions by Israel or the United
States.
Such a view of Iran¡¦s foreign policy, however, is
inconsistent not only with Iranian activities on the
ground but with the longstanding public statements of
its own leaders.
Iran¡¦s Islamic Revolution was predicated on a wellarticulated
set of ideological principles, and it does
not appear that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei¡Xthe country¡¦s
ultimate decisionmaking authority on foreign
policy and national security issues¡Xhas sought to
depart from these principles in any meaningful way.8
Both he and President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad have
repeatedly outlined a worldview that suggests that
Iran¡¦s strategic aspirations go far beyond mere defense
against outside threats.9 Through numerous letters to
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
4 Policy Focus #114
Iran¡¦s anti-imperialistic and anti-American philosophy
has been a consistent and enduring feature of Iranian
foreign policy and is grounded in a reading of history
that sees the United States¡Xthe leading force behind
the establishment of the liberal world order¡Xas overwhelmingly
responsible for the immoral and corrupt
state of mankind. Speaking at the 2009 UN Conference
on Racism, Ahmadinezhad, referring to the
United States, explained:
Over the last centuries, humanity has gone through
tremendous suffering and pain¡K[During] the period
of the slave trade, innocent people in the millions were
[captured] and separated from their families to be
taken to Europe and America¡KThe coercive powers
imposed two wars on Europe¡Khorrific wars claimed
100 million lives and left behind massive devastation¡K
Victorious powers called themselves conquerors of the
world, while ignoring the rights of other nations by
the imposition of oppressive laws and international
arrangements¡KThey are simply thinking about maintaining
power and wealth. They couldn¡¦t care any less
about the people of the world and even about their
own people.22
Iran¡¦s leaders believe that ¡§the arrogant regime in the
United States is the biggest obstacle against the cause of
the prophets.¡¨23 In announcing a series of ¡§World without
America¡¨ conferences in Tehran in 2005, Ahmadinezhad
declared that the ¡§accomplishment of a world
without America . . . is both possible and feasible¡KGod
willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon
experience a world without the United States.¡¨24
More recently, an editorial in Kayhan, a hardline
Tehran newspaper considered close to Khamenei,
argued that America¡¦s demise will ultimately come
about not through direct confrontation but rather¡X
like the former Soviet Union¡Xthrough gradual attrition
and the eventual liberation of the American people
from a government Ahmadinezhad sees as controlled
by ¡§capitalists,¡¨ ¡§imperialists,¡¨ and ¡§Zionists.¡¨25, 26
3. Iran¡¦s mission is to replace the current international
order with a new paradigm grounded in the
ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Iran¡¦s leaders have
repeatedly expressed their determination to overturn
the current international system¡Xwhich they perceive
and wealth, profit, and maximum pleasure and power
has [sic] been set as the prime target and...must be
realized using all possible ways and means. Telling
lies, making deceit¡Kexercising military power, using
even weapons of mass destruction and nuclear arms,
interference in internal affairs of other countries¡K
are all permitted¡KBased on this philosophy the
worst behaviors against human beings and the most
violent dictatorship are permitted.¡¨14
The global system established to promote democracy
and capitalism is seen by Iran¡¦s leaders as unsustainable,
and the recent global financial crisis is proof that the
capitalist system is approaching its demise: ¡§Capitalism
and capitalists will soon join history in the future.
Signs of their collapse are quite clear,¡¨ Ahmadinezhad
recently stated.15
Khamenei, too, has articulated his belief that liberal
Western governments have failed due to the whims
of capitalism and self-interest, which deny justice
to millions:
Islam disapproves of the Western model of economic
development, which brings about economic growth
and increases the wealth of certain levels of society at
the cost of impoverishing and lowering the living standards
of other social strata.¡¨16 He believes it is only a
matter of time before liberalism falls: ¡§The school of
Marxism has collapsed and the sound of the West¡¦s
cracking liberal democracy is now being heard.17
2. The United States is an illegitimate regime,
driven by imperialistic and materialistic impulses
that will lead to its ultimate decline. Described routinely
by Iran¡¦s leaders as a ¡§Satanic power,¡¨18 a force
of ¡§global arrogance,¡¨19 and the ¡§devil incarnate,¡¨20 the
United States is perceived as a cruel, greedy, and sinister
power bent on imperialism and global oppression.
As stated by Khamenei:
It is natural that our Islamic system should be viewed
as an enemy and an intolerable rival by such an
oppressive power as the United States, which is trying
to establish a global dictatorship and further its own
interests by dominating other nations and trampling
on their rights. It is also clear that the conflict and
confrontation between the two is something natural
and unavoidable.21
Iran¡¦s Worldview and Strategic Aspirations Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 5
regional objectives: building Gulf Arab support for
Iran¡¦s interests, supporting the emergence of pro-Iranian
governments in Iraq and Lebanon, and challenging
Israel¡¦s existence.
ƒô Pliant Gulf Arab states supportive of Iranian
interests. A longstanding Iranian goal has been to end
American influence in the Gulf and to co-opt Gulf
leaders into supporting Iran¡¦s broader regional ambitions.
Iran¡¦s vehement criticism of the Bahraini government¡¦s
crackdown on Shiite protestors and Saudi Arabia¡¦s
military intervention is indicative of the regime¡¦s
deep-seated antipathy to the Sunni Gulf monarchies.
And although the regime has often sought to reassure
its neighbors of its friendly intentions, it appears to
view the Western-backed Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) governments as fundamentally illegitimate.
A 2007 editorial in Kayhan, for example, accuses
Sunni Gulf states of being ¡§illegal regimes¡¨ established
through ¡§direct intervention of the forces of arrogance.¡¨
34 Moreover, in light of Iran¡¦s self-declared mission
to ¡§extend the sovereignty of God¡¦s law throughout
the world,¡¨35 Arab suspicions that Iran may once
again seek to challenge Saudi custody over the holy
cities continue to linger.
In addition, Iranian leaders have repeatedly declared
their interest in bringing the Gulf states into an Iranled
regional security framework. In 2006, for example,
Iran¡¦s then defense minister Mostafa Mohammad
Najjar offered a regional defense pact as a guarantor
of Persian Gulf security.36 Laid out in more detail by
a representative of Ali Khamenei, such a pact would
include Iran, the GCC states, and Iraq, and would be
focused on joint security projects as well as ¡§ending the
arms race in the Gulf¡¨¡Xa reference to the termination
of American military assistance. Ahmadinezhad, too,
recently warned Gulf states of a continued U.S. military
presence in the region.37
ƒô Iran-allied, anti-American regimes in control of
Lebanon and Iraq. Iran¡¦s leaders view Lebanon and
Iraq as battleground states in their efforts to end American
involvement in the region. By leveraging its influence
within the Shiite communities, Iran has sought to
as unjust and immoral. Speaking before the UN General
Assembly, Ahmadinezhad called for ¡§structural and
fundamental¡¨ change in the world, and made clear that
Iran is prepared to ¡§mobilize all its cultural, political,
and economic capabilities¡¨ to build a new international
system.27 Later, he declared, ¡§We have a plan to change
the world, to reshape the balance of oppressive [power]
in the world, and to [change] the unilateral and discriminatory
world order¡Kand we are progressing step
by step [in implementing] the plan.¡¨28
While vague in terms of describing its form, Iran¡¦s
leaders see the values of the Islamic Revolution as providing
universal inspiration for a new international
system. Proposing a ¡§return to monotheism,¡¨ Ahmadinezhad
has called for ¡§setting up a new international
economic order based on human and moral values and
obligations.¡¨29 The alternative to liberalism is a system
that ¡§espouses with the belief in the oneness of the
Almighty God, follows the teachings of His messengers,
respects human dignity and seeks to build a secure
world for all members of the human community.¡¨30
Speaking to an audience of religious students, he was
even more explicit about the role of Islam that Iran sees
in transforming the international system: ¡§Islam is¡Ka
universal ideology that leads the world to justice. We
don¡¦t shy away from declaring that Islam is ready to
rule the world. We must prepare ourselves to rule the
world.¡¨31
Iran¡¦s leaders have made clear that the new world
order would limit American and Western influences
and overturn ¡§the arrogant policies of the world.¡¨32
Emphasizing the need to restructure the UN, Ahmadinezhad
has called for the ¡§establishment of a common
global system that will be run with participation of all
nations of the world.¡¨33
Iran¡¦s Regional Objectives
Given Iran¡¦s relatively limited global influence, these
far-reaching ambitions may come across as fanciful,
perhaps even delusional. Nevertheless, they provide
inspiration for Iran¡¦s power projection within its own
region, where the country¡¦s influence is more pronounced.
Iran appears to be focused primarily on three
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
6 Policy Focus #114
control over the Islamic world¡Ktherefore¡Kthey established
an artificial, false and fictitious entity called
Israel.¡¨45 Ahmadinezhad has stated that the elimination
of Israel would help Iran achieve its broader goals
in the region because it would ¡§pave the way to the
appearance of Islam¡¦s power in successful management
of global [matters].¡¨46
Iran¡¦s calls for the destruction of Israel, however, are
not aimed at the physical annihilation of the Jewish
people, nor does Iran appear to be seeking a direct military
confrontation with Tel Aviv. Rather, Ahmadinezhad
and Khamenei have both called for a longer-term
process of continual cycles of asymmetric warfare¡X
described by analysts as the al-Muqawama doctrine¡X
using proxies to demoralize and wear down the Israeli
people, and ultimately force their ¡§Zionist leaders to
return to their homes, and to restore Palestine to its
original owners.¡¨47 Iran has repeatedly called for a referendum
to decide the future of all those living within
the pre-1948 Palestinian borders:
There is only one solution to the issue of Palestine¡K
This solution is to hold a referendum with the participation
of all native Palestinians, including Muslims,
Jews and Christians, the Palestinians who live both
inside and outside the occupied territories¡KWithout
this, the Palestinian issue would not be settled.48
Iran¡¦s support for Hizballah, Hamas, and other armed
militia groups is aimed in part at weakening Israeli
morale and forcing the imposition of such a referendum.
At the same time, Iran seeks to delegitimize the
Jewish state and inspire its overthrow ¡§by the storm of
wrath of the Palestinian people and free nations.¡¨49
Iran¡¦s Strategy to Achieve
Its Objectives
Despite its far-reaching ambitions, Tehran faces significant
constraints. On a global scale, Iran lacks the
economic and military might to challenge U.S. influence.
Its economy is less than one-fortieth the size of
that of the United States, and its defense budget is
seventy times less than that of the Pentagon. Despite
its sizable military forces, Iran remains vulnerable to
devastating or even regime-threatening attacks by the
bring about pro-Iranian regimes in both countries as a
counter to American influence. In Lebanon, Iran has
been working closely with Syria, Hizballah, and other
Lebanese factions to permanently establish a government
supportive of the Iran-led resistance axis. According
to current defense minister Ahmad Vahidi, Iran
hopes to supplant the United States as the main provider
of security assistance to Lebanon.38 With Hizballah¡¦s
allies now in control of Lebanon¡¦s government¡X
notably the defense and interior ministries¡XIran
appears to be moving closer toward such an outcome.
Iran has also sought to end U.S. involvement in
Iraq; as Khamenei recently stated, ¡§May God get rid
of America in Iraq so that its people¡¦s problems are
solved.¡¨39 Tehran regards Iraq as a natural partner in its
¡§popular resistance front¡¨ against Israel and the West.40
Led by a sectarian Shiite government, Iraq could provide
an important geostrategic link to Iran¡¦s allies in
Syria and Lebanon, and a potential platform from
which to leverage its influence across the Arab world.
As the withdrawal of U.S. forces continues, Iran aims
to capitalize on Baghdad¡¦s growing sense of vulnerability
in order to induce Iraq¡¦s leaders to rely on an Iranian
¡§defense umbrella¡¨ for its future stability.41
ƒô Challenge to Israel¡¦s existence. Through sustained
military and political pressure, Iranian leaders have
consistently sought to challenge the existence of the
state of Israel. This aspect of Iranian policy does not
appear to be driven by domestic considerations,42 nor
solely by a desire to build popular support in the Arab
street. Iranian opposition to Israel¡¦s existence appears
to stem instead from a firm conviction that the Jewish
state is a fundamental manifestation of Western influence
in the heart of the Middle East.
Noting that ¡§Zionism is a Western ideology and a
colonialist idea,¡¨43 Ahmadinejad contends that following
World War II ¡§the victorious powers¡Kresorted to
military aggression to make an entire nation homeless
on the pretext of Jewish sufferings¡¨ and ¡§sent migrants
from Europe and the U.S. to establish a totally racist
government.¡¨44 Reinforcing this perspective, Iran¡¦s former
parliamentary speaker Gholam Ali Adel has suggested
that ¡§England, then America, wished to have
Iran¡¦s Worldview and Strategic Aspirations Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 7
region, including U.S. forces.51 In addition to possessing
a large inventory of antiship cruise and short-range
missiles, Iran has developed several medium-range
ballistic missiles, including an extended version of the
Shahab-3 that is capable of reaching Israel and central
Europe. Iran has also reportedly tested a multistaged
solid-fuel missile, the Sejjil, as well as a space launch
vehicle.52 According to the Pentagon, Iran could have
an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching
the United States by 2015.53
ƒô Building its asymmetric and terrorist capabilities.
Iran has built an extensive network of paramilitary
groups and terrorist organizations on which it
relies to extend its projection of influence. Through the
Qods Force, an elite unit of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran engages in paramilitary
operations to support extremists and maintains operational
capabilities around the world, including a wellestablished
presence in the Middle East and North
Africa and, in recent years, an increased presence in
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.54 In addition,
Iran continues to arm terrorist and militant groups
who align with its strategic interests, including Hizballah,
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban,
as well as Shiite extremist groups in Iraq. According to
U.S. officials, Iran has also entered into a ¡§secret deal¡¨
with al-Qaeda, allowing the terrorist network to channel
funding and operatives through its territory.55 Iran
has sought to leverage the threat of violence and subversion
to pressure or intimidate other nations, while
maintaining plausible deniability as it simultaneously
pursues diplomacy to achieve its goals.
ƒô Leveraging soft power and public diplomacy. A
key element of Iran¡¦s strategy involves persuading the
Islamic world¡Xthe umma¡Xthat the Islamic Republic
supports their struggle against oppression, dictatorship,
and Western-backed imperialism. To this end,
Iran has invested significant resources in its propaganda
machinery, establishing television networks in Arabic
(al-Alam), English (Press TV), and even Spanish (Hispan
TV). In addition, Iran has attempted to exploit economic
and cultural ties to local populations to enhance
United States and its allies if Washington were to be
sufficiently provoked.
Closer to home, the regime¡¦s early hopes of kindling
Islamic revolutions throughout the Muslim world
failed to materialize, and despite its pronouncements,
none of the recent uprisings across the Middle East
appear to be inspired in any way by Iran. Meanwhile,
Israel is still the region¡¦s strongest military power, and
all Arab states in the Gulf and the Levant, with the
notable exception of Syria, have established close military
ties with the United States. Even in Iraq, Iran¡¦s
intensive campaign to pressure Baghdad to reject the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement in 2008 resulted in failure.
To some extent, Iranian influence has been selflimiting,
and as former U.S. ambassador to Iraq Ryan
Crocker expressed it, ¡§The harder they push, the more
resistance they get.¡¨50
Internally, too, the Iranian regime faces a range of
serious challenges. The Green Movement galvanized
support among hundreds of thousands of Iranians
who took to the streets to voice their opposition to the
Islamic Republic. And although the regime appears to
have suppressed it¡Xat least for now¡X the opposition
movement maintains a large political following, particularly
among young people, and remains a major
concern for leaders of the Islamic Republic. In addition,
Iran¡¦s economy¡Xalready ravaged by years of mismanagement
and corruption¡Xcontinues to struggle
in the face of mounting international sanctions and
financial restrictions.
Nevertheless, emboldened by a powerful military and
security apparatus and guided by a sense of ¡§manifest
destiny,¡¨ Iran remains well-positioned to project power
and influence¡Xboth regionally and internationally.
Tehran¡Xstrategically patient, cautious, and opportunistic¡X
appears to be taking a long view, with an emphasis
on making steady, incremental gains. The regime¡¦s strategy
appears focused on at least five distinct areas:
ƒô Strengthening its conventional military deterrent.
Iran has worked assiduously over the years to
develop and expand its ballistic missile arsenal, which
Tehran regards as ¡§an integral part of its strategy to
deter¡Xand if necessary retaliate against¡Xforces in the
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
8 Policy Focus #114
of anti-American allies beyond its region, hoping to
gain leverage in its bid to challenge the current international
order. These efforts have met with limited
success. Ahmadinezhad has garnered close ties with
leaders of a small number of mostly pariah states
in Africa and Latin America, including Venezuelan
president Hugo Chavez, Bolivian president Evo
Morales, Belorussian leader Alexander Lukashenko,
and Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. As Ahmadinezhad
proclaimed during one of the frequent visits
by Chavez, ¡§If . . . my brother Chavez and I and a few
other people were once alone in the world, we [now]
have a long line of revolutionary officials and people
standing alongside each other.¡¨60 Though still nascent,
Iran¡¦s strategic partnerships with some of these countries
are focused on strengthening military, intelligence,
and security cooperation¡Xwith the United
States viewed as the common enemy.
The acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability
may be another critical element of Iran¡¦s strategy to
advance its long-term objectives¡Xallowing it to magnify
its capabilities in each of these five areas and, as
discussed in the next chapter, enhance its influence in
meaningful and significant ways.
its leverage¡Xan effort that has been particularly successful
with certain Shiite communities in Iraq, Lebanon,
and Afghanistan.56
ƒô Solidifying its regional ¡§resistance front.¡¨ Seeing
itself as the ¡§vanguard of the Islamic world,¡¨57 Iran has
sought to consolidate and expand its resistance front
against Israel and the United States. Ahmadinezhad
has proclaimed that this front, which encompasses
Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas, is being strengthened
in the region as ¡§the waves of free nations willing
to join the resistance [are] spreading every day.¡¨58
Despite the exaggerated rhetoric¡Xneither Turkey
nor Qatar, as Iran has claimed, is truly supportive of
this front¡Xmomentum appears to be on Iran¡¦s side,
as it continues to gain influence in Lebanon and Iraq
(though this could change dramatically depending
on events within Syria). Citing the front as a means
to counter American influence, Khamenei recently
stated that ¡§America is the main opposer to the axis
of resistance.59
ƒô Establishing a global coalition of anti-American
allies. Iran has been seeking to establish a network
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 9
3 | Iran as a Nuclear Weapons State
The scenarios that follow focus on areas in which
Iran has been seeking to expand its influence and
achieve its aspirations: (1) in the Gulf, where Iran has
long sought greater influence and control, (2) in Iraq,
where Iran has been working assiduously to build
partnerships with a Shiite-led government, (3) in the
Levant, where Iran has sought to strengthen its allies
and proxies to mount a challenge against Israel, (4) in
Latin America, where Iran has been quietly building a
platform to extend its influence, and (5) through terrorism
directed against the United States more generally.
This list is not exhaustive; Iran has had an active
presence in other regions, including Africa and central
Asia. But the scenarios here suggest places where
a nuclear weapons capability might have a particular
impact on Iran¡¦s ability to directly threaten important
U.S. strategic interests.
Each of these scenarios is built around existing
trends and dynamics and grounded in Iranian strategic
intentions. These are not worst-case scenarios, nor
are they necessarily the most likely. Rather, the hypothetical
events described are intended to illustrate
reasonably possible outcomes that warrant serious
consideration when evaluating the potential impacts
of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Other
potential outcomes are discussed in the analysis that
follows each scenario.
The focus here is on Iranian behavior and activities¡X
that is, the extent to which Iranian leaders
might consciously seek to leverage a nuclear capacity
toward achieving their long-term objectives.65
Underpinning each of these scenarios are the following
assumptions:
1. Iran has hypothetically achieved a nuclear weapons
capability¡Xat least in the form of a breakout
capacity¡Xand has dispersed in sufficient quantities
fissile material, nuclear weapons components, and/
or nuclear warheads to ensure their survival in the
event of an outside attack.
Iranian officials have consistently denied
that they are seeking to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. Some Iranian scholars have, in fact, suggested
that the use of nuclear weapons¡Xor perhaps
even their possession¡Xis prohibited under Iran¡¦s
interpretation of Islam.61 Given the opacity of Iranian
decisionmaking, it is difficult to be certain how
Tehran might view the potential utility of acquiring
nuclear capability. Still, given the scope of its global
ambitions and enormous investment in nuclear activities
over the past three decades, it is reasonable to
assume that Tehran might see nuclear capability, if
not the actual deployment of a nuclear weapon, as a
useful component in its bid for enhanced power and
influence. A 2006 Kayhan editorial hinted at Iran¡¦s
intentions:62
North Korea has built a [nuclear] bomb before the
Americans¡¦ eyes¡Kand no one has managed to do anything¡K
What this means precisely is that if any country¡K
concludes, for political or security reasons, that it
must have nuclear weapons, it will ultimately succeed
in implementing its wish¡Xeven if the whole world
doesn¡¦t want it to.¡¨
As Iran approaches a threshold nuclear capability, it
could adopt any of several potential models. One possibility
is for Tehran to conduct a nuclear explosive test
and declare itself openly as a nuclear weapons state, as
North Korea did in 2005. Another possibility is for Iran
to secretly develop and deploy nuclear weapons while
maintaining official denials that it is doing so¡Xa posture
that Israel continues to employ to this day. As an
alternative, Iran could establish a breakout capability¡X
whereby it curtails its enrichment and weaponization
efforts at a certain point, with the assumption that it
could develop and deploy a nuclear warhead within a
very short time (e.g., six months or less) after deciding
to do so.63 Upon developing a nuclear capability, Iran
would almost certainly seek to expand and disperse its
arsenal to enhance its survivability and maintain a second-
strike capability.64
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
10 Policy Focus #114
Even with complete information, positing scenarios
and projecting how a nation might behave under
varying circumstances involves a significant degree
of speculation. The goal here is to contribute to the
current discourse by grounding such speculation
in the context of available sources and reasonable
extrapolation.
The outcomes described in these scenarios could
conceivably occur months, years, or perhaps even a
decade or more after Iran has achieved a nuclear weapons
capability.
2. Tehran¡¦s national security objectives extend beyond
simply defending against outside threats to the Islamic
Republic; Iran is seeking to expand its ideological influence
in the Middle East and ultimately challenge U.S.
and Western dominance of the international system.
3. Iran¡¦s leaders are rational, in the sense that they are
not seeking to launch a suicidal nuclear attack against
an adversary; rather, they are seeking to use a nuclear
weapons capability to maximize power and influence
in pursuit of their foreign policy goals.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 11
Diplomatic support from Gulf ¡½¡½ states for U.S. regional
goals, including support for a two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, financial and other
assistance for the Palestinian Authority (PA), support
for moderates in Lebanon, and, more recently,
support for NATO operations in Libya.
Impact of a Nuclear Capability
Iran¡¦s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may
initially prompt Gulf states to seek stronger defensive
measures against Iran and, possibly, protection under
a U.S. nuclear umbrella. Alternatively, some states¡X
independently or under the auspices of the GCC¡X
might seek to establish their own nuclear weapons
deterrent, either through indigenous programs or, in
the case of Saudi Arabia, with assistance from Pakistan
or Egypt. With confidence in the United States likely
to be shaken over a U.S. failure to prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons, and given lingering discord
over the perceived U.S. abandonment of former Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarak and the GCC military
intervention in Bahrain, the Saudis may be even more
inclined to consider their own nuclear option.
Yet the impact of such deterrent and containment
measures is uncertain. While they may succeed in deterring
direct aggression, they may be of limited value in preventing
Iran from engaging in certain types of asymmetric
or subversive activities. Iran is likely to avoid openly
provocative actions that could alienate Arab public
Iranian Objectives and Activities
Tehran has long sought to counter American influence
in the Persian Gulf. Having abandoned overt attempts
to undermine Gulf monarchies, Iran has worked to
pursue cordial relationships with these regimes while
subtly reminding them of its influence and capability
to harm their interests. Iran¡¦s specific objectives appear
to be focused on inducing Gulf states to endorse, or
at least acquiesce to, Iran¡¦s regional priorities¡Xa concerted
resistance front against Israel, a sectarian Shiite
government in Iraq, and a preeminent Iranian voice on
GCC economic and security issues. Ultimately, Tehran
seeks to end the U.S. military presence in the Gulf and
induce the regime¡¦s Sunni neighbors to join an Iran-led
regional defense framework.
U.S. Interests at Stake
The United States has several interests in the Gulf
region that could be jeopardized by Iran¡¦s acquisition
of a nuclear capability, including the following:
¡½¡½ Close security relationships with each of the Gulf
states, grounded in efforts to cooperate against
extremism and ensure a steady and reliable supply
of oil.
¡½¡½ A significant military presence, including a host of
army, air, and naval bases in various Gulf countries,
as a lever of force projection in the Persian Gulf.
Empowered by its presumed nuclear credentials, Iran intensifies pressure on Arab Gulf states to reduce
or end an American military presence and join an expanding Arab network in support of Iran¡¦s regional
goals. While conducting a large naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, Iran¡¦s president reissues a call for
Arab states to join a proposed Iran-led regional security organization. Later, a senior Bahraini official is
assassinated in Manama¡Xand a local Shiite extremist group with alleged ties to Iran is implicated in the
attack. Tensions flare as Saudi Arabia threatens retaliation, while Tehran denies responsibility and warns
that the region will suffer if its interests are harmed. The Gulf effort to present a united front eventually
falters after Qatar¡Xseeking to reduce tensions and placate Iran¡Xoffers to terminate U.S. access to
al-Udeid Air Base. Kuwait and Oman follow by reducing the U.S. military presence in their countries¡X
while privately urging the United States to stand up to Iran.
ƒôSCENARIO 1: Iran pressures Gulf states to reduce or end
the U.S. military presence.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
12 Policy Focus #114
its impact, any such confrontation could seriously
undermine regional security, disrupt global energy
supplies, and threaten global economic and financial
stability. U.S. military intervention might also be
necessary at some point¡Xthough this could be complicated
in the face of a nuclear Iran.
¡½¡½ Diminished U.S. military presence. Some Gulf
states may eventually seek to appease Iran by reducing
or eliminating the basing of U.S. military forces in
their countries. The United States maintains a significant
presence in the Gulf, with roughly 27,000 U.S.
forces deployed at an array of bases and sites.68 While
Gulf states have quietly welcomed the presence of U.S.
forces as a wedge against Iran, they have also been concerned
that such a presence could provoke a backlash
on the domestic front and potentially spark extremist
violence. Indeed, such concerns have prompted
Gulf states¡Xincluding Saudi Arabia¡Xto limit U.S.
military operations on their soil in the past.69 The
loss of overflight rights or access to Gulf air and naval
bases¡Xwhether sporadic or permanent¡Xcould have a
deleterious impact on the U.S. ability to project force,
carry out intelligence missions, and maintain freedom
of navigation in the Gulf.70
¡½¡½ Reduced support for U.S. regional priorities.
Some Gulf states might seek to accommodate Iran
by drawing down their support for moderate political
actors in the region, including the PA71 and the
March 14 coalition in Lebanon. Certain states might
go even further¡Xfor example, by following Qatar¡¦s
lead in providing funding to Hizballah, Hamas, and
other Iran-backed groups.
¡½¡½ Manipulation of oil markets. Another way Gulf
states might accommodate Iran is by acceding to
pressure to parrot the Iranian line on oil production
quotas and pricing for OPEC.72 The impact of
such actions, however, might be mitigated by Saudi
Arabia¡¦s likely efforts to counter Iranian oil-price
manipulation.
opinion, invite international condemnation, or prompt a
direct retaliatory response. But shielded by nuclear weapons,
Iran might seek new opportunities to indirectly or
implicitly threaten the security or financial interests of
Gulf monarchies, confident that these actions will ultimately
diminish Gulf resolve to resist Iranian dictates.
Such actions could include initiating disputes over the
extraction of oil and gas reserves, funneling assistance to
Shiite extremists, or engaging in plausibly deniable terrorist
attacks.
While the GCC may stand firm and united¡Xat
least initially¡Xin the face of such threats, it is possible
that, over time, one or more Gulf states might attempt
to reduce tensions by seeking ways to accommodate
and appease Tehran, at least on issues not considered
vital to their security. Such an inclination would not
be unprecedented. Qatar¡¦s diplomatic overtures to Iran
and financial support for Hizballah in recent years
appear intended to ameliorate a strengthening Iranian
regime.66 Other Gulf states have also sought to showcase
friendly diplomatic relationships with Tehran
by inviting President Ahmadinezhad for handshakes
and diplomatic visits and issuing statements welcoming
cooperation in a range of areas.67 Although Iran¡¦s
perceived support for Shiite protestors in Bahrain may
have halted this trend for now, if faced with a nuclear
Iran, certain Gulf countries may come to see accommodation
as a better alternative to the increasing risk
of military, or even nuclear, confrontation.
As a result, potential consequences for the United
States include:
¡½¡½ Increased risk of violence and military conflict.
As it looks for plausibly deniable ways to intimidate
and subvert Gulf monarchies, an emboldened Iran
could decide to direct terrorist attacks in the Gulf,
possibly even targeting U.S. interests. Moreover, Gulf
efforts to contain and deter Iran could escalate tensions
in the region and increase the risk of violence
and conflict. A military confrontation between Iran
and the Gulf states¡Xboth potentially armed with
nuclear weapons¡Xcould have drastic consequences.
While crisis diplomacy might succeed in containing
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 13
ƒôSCENARIO 2: Iran establishes a defense partnership
with Iraq.
of military and financial resources, Washington has
a key interest in ensuring a successful outcome in
Iraq.75 The emergence of a secure, democratic, and
peaceful Iraq would be seen as a major accomplishment
for the United States and could help reestablish
U.S. credibility and prestige in the region.
Building a strategic partnership ¡½¡½ with Iraq. The
United States has an interest in building a longerterm
strategic partnership with Iraq and has been
looking to Baghdad as a future partner in efforts to
counter extremism and promote peace and security
across the region.
Impact of a Nuclear Capability
Iran¡¦s efforts to influence political developments in Iraq
over the past several years have produced mixed results.
Nevertheless, relying on a combination of hard and
soft power, Iran remains well positioned to have a significant
influence on Iraq¡Xone that could be strengthened
by a nuclear capability.76 One possibility is that a
nuclear-capable Iran might feel free to take greater risks
in instigating violence in Iraq¡Xespecially if American
troops maintain a continuous presence there. But as
has happened in the past, an openly aggressive stance
toward Iraq could undermine Iran¡¦s influence with the
Iraqi government and force the latter to continue to
look to the United States to help guarantee its security.
Rather than take an aggressive stance toward Baghdad,
Iran might leverage the enhanced psychological
benefits it would likely derive from a nuclear weapons
Iranian Objectives and Activities
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran¡¦s political
objectives in Iraq have focused on uniting Iraq¡¦s Shiite
parties in order to ensure their control so that the
Iraqi government is sympathetic to Iranian interests.
In addition, Iran has sought to counter the U.S. military
presence in Iraq and compel full withdrawal of all
remaining American troops. In the longer term, Tehran
appears to be seeking to persuade the Iraqi government
to end security cooperation with the United States and
support Iran¡¦s regional goals, including joining its resistance
front against Israel.73
In pursuit of these objectives, Iran has sought to
establish cordial relationships with Iraqi Shiite politicians
while simultaneously supplying money, weapons,
and training to select Shiite militant and terrorist
groups in Iraq, including Sadr¡¦s Promised Day Brigade,
Kataib Hizballah, and Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH). In
addition, the IRGC Qods Force uses Lebanese Hizballah
to provide training, tactics, and technology.74
Despite the often complicated relationship between
Tehran and Sadr, Iran appears to be working to exert
greater influence on the leader¡Xperhaps seeking to
replicate the Iranian relationship with Hassan Nasrallah,
the Lebanon-based head of Hizballah.
U.S. Interests at Stake
The United States has several strategic interests in Iraq:
¡½¡½ Maintaining support for a stable, secure, and democratic
Iraq. Given the enormous U.S. expenditure
Invigorated by its nuclear prowess and growing prestige within the Iraqi Shiite community, Tehran
embarks on a concerted effort to end Baghdad¡¦s continuing reliance on American military support.
Muqtada al-Sadr¡Xnow leading an increasingly powerful coalition of Shiite political parties¡Xreasserts
his demands for an end to Iraqi security cooperation with the United States. Under pressure from this
coalition, Iraq¡¦s prime minister takes action to dismiss remaining U.S. training forces and announces that
Iraq will look to countries other than the United States for future weapons procurement. The prime minister
later accepts Tehran¡¦s offer to sign a new defense pact¡Xleading to the initiation of Iran-Iraq military
exercises and the development of a joint early-warning air defense network against Israel.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
14 Policy Focus #114
troops, but also limiting any future U.S. training
role in the country. Iraq might also scale back or
cancel plans for weapons purchases from the United
States, further reducing U.S. political leverage. At
an extreme, Iraq could end security cooperation
altogether. The loss of Iraq as a security partner
would represent a significant strategic setback for
the United States.
¡½¡½ Ending Iraq¡¦s role as regional partner. Along with
possibly weakening security ties between Iraq and
the United States, intensified pressure to accommodate
Iran could lead the Iraqi government to align
itself more closely with Tehran on regional and international
issues. For example, Iran might look to Iraq
for support in the Arab League on issues relating to
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or Hizballah¡¦s
role in Lebanon, or at the United Nations on issues
relating to sanctions against Iran.
¡½¡½ Strengthening an Iran-Iraq military partnership.
Despite public statements affirming the need for
closer ties, Iraqi leaders have resisted Iranian requests
to initiate meaningful cooperation on security and
defense issues. However, with an Iraqi government
looking to accommodate an increasingly powerful
Iran, this dynamic could change, especially if radical
Shiite groups such as the Sadr Movement succeed
in obtaining greater control over a future Iraqi government.
For example, Iran might seek to establish
a transit corridor through Iraq for weapons transfers
to Syria and Lebanon, as well as persuade Baghdad
to join it in conducting military exercises and cooperative
defensive efforts (e.g., an early-warning airdefense
system against Israel). At some point, Iraq
might also feel compelled to turn to Iran¡Xalong
with other suppliers such as Russia and China¡Xfor
future weapons purchases.
capability to intensify efforts aimed at reinforcing
Iraq¡¦s inclination to accommodate Tehran. Given
Iran¡¦s history of support for violent proxies in Iraq and
the long, porous border shared by the two countries,
Iraqi leaders are already well aware of Iran¡¦s ability to
cause mischief. Having successfully challenged U.S.
red lines regarding its nuclear capability, Iran would
be seen as a rising, hegemonic power in the region,
potentially heightening Iraq¡¦s sense of vulnerability
to malevolent Iranian influence and forcing Baghdad
to further accommodate Iranian interests.
In addition, a nuclear capability could enhance
Iran¡¦s prestige and political leverage with radical
Shiite parties in Iraq. As reflected by its role in brokering
a new coalition government in 2010, Iran
has already established the expectation that it will
play a critical role in the selection of any future Iraqi
prime minister. Backed by a nuclear Iran, groups
such as the Sadr Movement may gain popular support
and potentially enhanced political clout in
Iraq¡¦s parliament or governing coalition¡Xproviding
Iran with even greater influence over future Iraqi
decisionmaking.
The net effect is that, faced with a nuclear Iran,
Iraqi leaders could find themselves under even greater
pressure to accommodate Iranian interests on key
political issues in ways that could be detrimental
to the United States. The potential consequences
include:
¡½¡½ Diminishing U.S. security cooperation. The
fate of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq lies in the
hands of the Iraqi government, which is currently
considering an extension beyond the end of 2011.
But a future Iraqi government¡Xunder pressure
from a nuclear-capable Iran¡Xmay feel increasingly
compelled to appease Tehran by not only requiring
the withdrawal of all remaining American combat
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 15
protect the state against terrorism and other violence
are important U.S. concerns.
Maintaining the viability of a two-¡½¡½ state solution. The
United States has long sought to promote a peaceful
end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through
the establishment of a viable independent Palestinian
state, backed by Arab governments at peace with
Israel.
¡½¡½ Supporting moderate, democratic governments in the
region. The United States has sought to support the
establishment of moderate, pro-democratic governments
in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories,
and the defeat of radical, violent ideologies represented
by Hizballah and Hamas.
Impact of a Nuclear Capability
To date, Iran has avoided direct involvement in Israeli
military conflicts involving Hizballah or Hamas. However,
shielded by a nuclear weapons capability, Iran
may be prepared to take greater risks to advance its
objectives in the Levant. One possibility is that Iran¡¦s
leaders could extend an implicit nuclear umbrella to
Hizballah and, though perhaps less likely, Hamas.78
This could range from an open declaration by Iranian
leaders threatening direct military retaliation by Iran in
the event of an Israeli action against Hamas or Hizballah,
to a more vague statement of support for its allies
in the Levant¡Xbut one implying that Iran is prepared
to intervene in any future conflict against Israel.79 To
enhance the credibility of such a deterrent threat, Iran
might at some point seek to deploy missiles armed
Iranian Objectives and Activities
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran¡¦s primary
objective in the Levant has been to undermine the
legitimacy and security of the state of Israel. To accomplish
this goal, Iran has invested heavily in Hizballah
and Hamas, transferring hundreds of millions of dollars
to each of these organizations and steadily enhancing
the strength and sophistication of their respective
arsenals.77 Iran probably views Hizballah¡¦s asymmetric
capabilities as an important component of its deterrent
strategy against potential U.S. or Israeli military
strikes.
In addition to enhancing the military capabilities
of Hamas and Hizballah, Iranian assistance has been
aimed at strengthening these organizations¡¦ political
base of support and building the cause of the ¡§resistance
front¡¨ to mount a political challenge against
Western-leaning forces in Lebanon and the Palestinian
territories. In the longer term, Iran appears to be seeking
to maintain and intensify pressure against Israel
through continual cycles of asymmetric warfare¡Xwith
the end goal of forcing the ¡§Zionist regime¡¨ to collapse
or accept Tehran¡¦s demands for a referendum open to
all inhabitants of pre-1948 Palestine regarding a future
Palestinian state.
U.S. Interests at Stake
The United States has several interests in the Levant:
¡½¡½ Ensuring the security of Israel. As a longstanding
democratic ally in the Middle East, Israel represents
a priority for the United States¡Xand helping to
Buoyed by its nuclear weapons breakthrough, Iran declares that it will employ the full range of its defensive
capabilities to protect its allies in Lebanon and Palestine from armed attack¡Xsuggesting that it is
prepared to retaliate directly against Israel with a devastating attack if Israel launches an all-out assault
on Hizballah or Hamas. In addition, Tehran deploys several dozen Sejjil-2 surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to any location within Israel. Unconfirmed reports suggest
that the IRGC may also be seeking to transfer a small number of radiological dispersion devices to
Hizballah.
ƒôSCENARIO 3: Iran extends its nuclear umbrella to encompass
Hizballah and Hamas.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
16 Policy Focus #114
Because the possible costs are so great, some analysts
have suggested that Israel would necessarily act
to prevent such transfers, even if it meant risking
nuclear brinksmanship. But given the catastrophic
consequences that could follow from misjudging
Iran¡¦s behavior, Israeli officials would be placed in
an extraordinarily difficult predicament. In situations
in which intelligence regarding suspected
transfers of weapons or responsibility for attacks
was less than foolproof, Israel might well be forced
to err on the side of restraint to avoid a potential
showdown.83
The net effect of a more restrained Israel is that,
over time, Hizballah and Hamas would continue to
enhance the strength, sophistication, and accuracy
of their military arsenals, potentially diminishing
the overwhelming military advantage that Israel
enjoys today. Mutual deterrence may prevent conflict
for some time. But Israel may find itself increasingly
on the defensive against enemies that are
willing to directly target civilians and risk greater
civilian casualties on their own side as they pursue
their ideological aims¡Xleading to a bloodier and
more destructive outcome the next time Iran or its
proxies decide to provoke a conflict.84
¡½¡½ Strengthening the resistance axis. Another
potential impact of Iran¡¦s successful acquisition
of a nuclear weapons capability is the strengthened
popular appeal of the resistance cause in the
Arab world. Hizballah and Hamas would likely
trumpet a nuclear Iran as evidence of the growing
strength of the resistance movement and weakness
of the United States, Israel, and the West,
given that the latter could not prevent such an
outcome. Such a development could significantly
demoralize Arab moderates and spur fence-sitters
to join what appears to be an inevitably victorious
resistance front.85
An emboldened resistance could also allow Hizballah
to further consolidate political power in Lebanon
and permanently weaken the March 14 camp.
For its part, Hamas might gain greater political
support among Palestinians, increasing its political
with conventional or possibly even nuclear warheads in
Syria or Lebanon.
While risky, such a scenario must be seriously considered
given Iran¡¦s ideological commitment to challenging
Israel¡¦s existence. Iranian leaders would probably prefer
to avoid a direct military confrontation with Israel, but
they may be willing to extend such a defensive umbrella
if they believe that it stood a reasonably good chance of
deterring Israel from future attacks against Iran¡¦s allies.80
Iran might feel particularly compelled to intervene in
this manner in the event that Hizballah or Hamas were
facing a devastating Israeli assault.
Consequences for U.S. interests in the Levant could
be significant, and include:
¡½¡½ Limiting Israeli freedom of action. Israeli strategic
culture places a high value on the ability to conduct
retaliatory strikes for attacks against Israeli citizens,
as well as to take preemptive action to prevent
certain arms transfers that cross Israeli red lines.
Already, the threat of escalating conflict has forced
Israel to accept the transfer of certain precisionguided
missiles, antiaircraft systems, and, reportedly,
Scud ballistic missiles.81 But in the face of a
nuclear-capable Iran, Israel might be forced to act
with even greater caution in initiating preemptive
or retaliatory strikes¡Xgiven the potential of these
strikes to escalate into a direct conflict with Iran.82
As a result, Hizballah and Hamas may feel more
free to engage in low-level military actions against
Israeli civilians, potentially including more frequent
rocket attacks, targeted assassinations, or suicide
bombings. Furthermore, an Iranian nuclear capability
could induce Tehran or Syria to transfer increasing
numbers of sophisticated weapons to Hizballah
or Hamas. A particularly dangerous escalation
could involve the potential transfer to Hizballah of
radiological dispersion devices (or ¡§dirty bombs¡¨)
or even chemical weapons. While attempting such
transfers would be provocative, Tehran might calculate
that the psychological impact on the Israeli
population and the deterrent effect on the Israeli
military would be significant enough to warrant
such risks.
Iran as a Nuclear Weapons State Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 17
agreement by initiating terrorist attacks or gaining
enough political clout to force Palestinian moderates
to permanently abandon efforts toward a two-state
solution.
leverage vis-a-vis Fatah and potentially weakening
the PA¡¦s authority to pursue a negotiated solution
to the conflict with Israel. Hamas might also be in
a stronger position to scuttle any potential peace
18 Policy Focus #114
U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Hizballah¡¦s
activities in Venezuela, leading to the designation in
2008 of two Venezuela-based Hizballah supporters.92
Reports also indicate growing contacts between Venezuela
and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including
Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad¡X
although the nature and purpose of these activities
remain opaque.93
In addition, Iran and Venezuela¡Xat least in rhetoric¡X
have indicated an interest in working together on
nuclear issues. The two countries signed an agreement
in 2008 formalizing efforts to ¡§cooperate in the field
of nuclear technology,¡¨94 and a senior aide to Chavez
recently stated that Iran was helping detect and test
uranium deposits found in remote areas of Venezuela.95
In September 2009, Chavez announced an agreement
enlisting Russia¡¦s help in developing a civilian nuclear
reactor as well as plans to establish a ¡§nuclear village¡¨
with technological assistance from Iran96¡Xthough
Chavez later claimed he had decided to call off the
country¡¦s nuclear plans.97
U.S. Interests at Stake
The United States has several important interests in
Latin America:
Denying support for terrorist ¡½¡½ networks. The United
States has a strong interest in preventing Latin
America from being used as a hub for terrorist operations.
Hizballah, which was responsible for two
major terrorist attacks in Argentina in the 1990s,
Iranian Objectives and Activities
Iran has been seeking to expand its growing network
of anti-Western regimes in different parts of the world,
and has in recent years solidified relationships with
several countries in Latin America, with Venezuela
marking the cornerstone of these efforts. Chavez and
Ahmadinezhad have established a self-declared ¡§axis
of unity¡¨¡Xa close strategic partnership centered on a
shared interest in challenging U.S. imperialism, capitalism,
and ¡§global arrogance.¡¨86 Having exchanged visits
on numerous occasions, both leaders have declared
their desire to work cooperatively in establishing a
¡§new world order.¡¨87 Iran appears to be investing in
Venezuela as a platform for the projection of Iranian
power in the Western Hemisphere.
Although the nature of the relationship between
Iran and Venezuela is unclear, the two nations appear
to be moving toward cooperation in the security arena.
In April 2008, they entered into a memorandum of
understanding pledging ¡§full military support and
cooperation,¡¨88 and according to a Pentagon report,
the IGRC Qods Force has increased its presence in
Venezuela.89 U.S. officials have also raised concerns
about potential Iranian shipments of unmanned aerial
vehicles to Venezuela.90 The establishment of a direct
Iran Air flight from Tehran to Damascus to Caracas
as well as a direct shipping line between Iran and Venezuela
have added to concerns about the extent of their
military cooperation.91
Venezuela also appears to be serving, at least to
some extent, as a locus for Iran-backed terrorist groups.
ƒôSCENARIO 4: Iran and Venezuela expand strategic
cooperation.
Having announced their intention to challenge U.S. hegemony and establish a new world order, Iranian
and Venezuelan leaders enter a series of agreements intended to deepen strategic cooperation
between their two nations¡Xincluding the establishment of a mutual defense pact. Meanwhile, intelligence
reports indicate that IRGC Qods Force and Hizballah operatives have established joint training
facilities in Venezuela and are actively seeking to expand operational terrorist cells capable of attacking
the United States. With IRGC officers providing onsite support, Caracas also prepares to deploy several
dozen Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Other reports
suggest Iran may be planning to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to the Venezuelan government.
Iran as a Nuclear Weapons State Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 19
Venezuela could emerge as a safe haven for Iranbacked
terrorist networks aiming to threaten U.S.
interests in the Western Hemisphere. Such a haven
could also be used as a launchpad to facilitate sustained
entry of Hizballah or other terrorist operatives
into the United States.98
¡½¡½ Nuclear/ballistic missile proliferation. A nuclearready
Iran might be willing to take greater risks in
transferring increasingly lethal and sophisticated
weapons systems to Venezuela. Iran, for example,
could seek to transfer ballistic missiles to Venezuela
to help strengthen its conventional missile deterrent
capabilities.99 Iran might also be prepared to transfer
sensitive nuclear technology to Venezuela, as well
as provide technical assistance and advanced centrifuges
to help Chavez establish an ostensibly civilian
nuclear program.
It is also conceivable¡Xthough perhaps unlikely,
at least in the near term¡Xthat an emboldened Iran
could contemplate the transfer of nuclear warheads
or component parts to Venezuela.100 Such a move
would be risky and provocative¡Xpotentially leading
to a showdown with the United States along
the lines of the Cuban Missile Crisis. But if Venezuelan
and Iranian leaders were convinced that such a
transfer would significantly advance their strategic
aspirations and could be completed secretly, without
advance U.S. detection, they might be willing to take
such a risk. The two countries might reasonably conclude
that if the United States was unwilling to risk
military retaliation to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons, then Washington would be even
less likely to risk military action against a nuclearcapable
Iran¡Xor against a Venezuela that was potentially
shielded by a nuclear-capable Iran¡Xfor such
suspected transfers.
¡½¡½ Deepening anti-American axis in Latin America
and beyond. Backed by a nuclear capability, Iran
and Venezuela could use their enhanced political
and military influence to expand their nascent
anti-imperialist alliance. Iran has sought to establish
closer relationships with other anti-American
leaders in Latin America,101 including those in
has long relied on Lebanese diaspora communities
in Latin America for financial support. The United
States has also been working with Colombia to pressure
Venezuela to stop providing a safe haven for the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC),
a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
¡½¡½ Countering nuclear and missile proliferation. The
United States has sought to limit the proliferation of
nuclear and ballistic missile components and technology
in Latin America, and has a particularly compelling
interest in ensuring that such items are kept
out of the hands of rogue regimes.
¡½¡½ Promoting democracy and free trade. The United
States has been keen to promote democracy, open
markets, and free trade throughout Latin America.
Despite successful democratic transitions across the
region, the United States has noted growing setbacks
in countries like Venezuela, where Chavez has acted
to tighten his grip on power by abolishing term limits
and restricting the ability of opposition movements
to challenge his rule.
Impact of a Nuclear Capability
The impact of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability
will depend on how far Iran and Venezuela are
prepared to go in deepening their strategic relationship.
Despite their eagerness to showcase a solid anti-
American front, the two nations make for somewhat
strange bedfellows¡Xan ideologically driven Islamic
regime joining forces with an opportunistic, flamboyant,
and often self-promoting Latin populist. But if
the two nations¡¦ commitment to cooperate in confronting
¡§American imperialism¡¨ remains solid, and
assuming Chavez overcomes his current bout with
cancer, the Iran-Venezuela axis, backed by Iranian
nuclear weapons, could be worrisome for the United
States.
The consequences could include:
¡½¡½ A safe haven for Iran-backed terrorists. Shielded
by a nuclear weapons capability, Iran could feel
empowered to escalate its support for its terrorist
connections in Latin America. Supported by Iran,
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
20 Policy Focus #114
Iran could also seek to replicate its multifaceted
relationship with Venezuela by deepening existing
partnerships with other anti-Western regimes
across the globe, including North Korea, Belarus,
and Sudan.
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua¡Xall of
whom belong to Chavez¡¦s Bolivarian Alliance for
the Americas. Especially noteworthy in this regard
are the growing political, economic, and security
ties between Iran and Bolivia.102 Down the road,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 21
against its nuclear facilities, and (3) more broadly,
maintaining an asymmetric challenge to U.S. power
and influence in the Middle East and beyond.
U.S. Interests at Stake
Preventing terrorist attacks. The ¡½¡½ United States has
bolstered its intelligence collection and homeland
security efforts in order to detect and prevent terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests around the world
and at home.
¡½¡½ Maintaining freedom of action. The United States
seeks to preserve freedom of action to conduct foreign
policy activities and pursue national security
interests without being constrained or deterred by
threats of violence or terrorism.
Impact of a Nuclear Capability
Outside Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran has refrained over
the past fifteen years from conducting terrorist attacks
against Americans. Iranian leaders may have concluded
that the potential benefits of carrying out such attacks
have not been worth the risks¡Xwhich include provoking
direct U.S. military retaliation, additional economic
sanctions, and/or further diplomatic isolation. But the
acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability might alter
Iran¡¦s risk calculus in this regard.
Iranian leaders might reasonably conclude that a
nuclear capability would shield the Islamic Republic
from direct military retaliation, thus allowing it
Iranian Objectives and Activities
Throughout its history, the Islamic Republic of Iran
has used terrorism as a tactic to advance its diplomatic
and foreign policy objectives.103 The primary target of
Iran-backed terrorist activity has been Israel, but past
attacks have targeted Americans as well. Such actions
include the Hizballah-orchestrated attacks against
the U.S. embassy, consulate, and Marine barracks in
Beirut in 1983, and against U.S. armed forces at Khobar
Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. More recently,
Iran has concentrated its support for violent insurgent
groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that have targeted
local leaders and civilians, as well as U.S. civilian
and military personnel.
Iran remains the world¡¦s ¡§most active state sponsor
of terrorism,¡¨104 and its terrorist capabilities¡Xboth
regionally and globally¡Xare formidable. According
to a Department of Defense report, ¡§Iran has
methodically cultivated a network of sponsored terrorist
surrogates capable of conducting effective, plausibly
deniable attacks against¡Kthe United States.¡¨105
In addition, former U.S. intelligence chief Dennis
Blair has stated that Hizballah might consider attacks
against the homeland ¡§if it perceives that the U.S. is
threatening its core interests.¡¨106
Iranian support for terrorist groups capable of targeting
U.S. interests appears aimed at (1) countering
the presence of U.S. forces in the region, (2) providing
a deterrent against a potential U.S. or Israeli military
attack against Iran, including a preemptive strike
ƒôSCENARIO 5: Iran facilitates terrorist attacks against
the United States.
As reports mount of new atrocities against the people of Darfur, the United States and its NATO allies
begin serious consultations on imposing a no-fly zone over Sudan. Iran¡¦s president declares his adamant
opposition to military intervention in Sudan¡Xa longstanding Iranian strategic partner¡Xand warns that
the West will pay a heavy price if such an action proceeds. As NATO foreign ministers convene in Athens,
suitcase bombs detonate in the lobby of a resort hotel in the Greek islands popular among American
tourists, killing dozens. Though Iran denies any involvement, subsequent information reveals that
al-Qaeda operatives¡Xwith possible logistical support from Hizballah¡Xwere behind the attack. With
intelligence reports suggesting plans for further attacks in Europe, NATO indefinitely postpones a decision
on a no-fly zone over Sudan.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
22 Policy Focus #114
of Americans. In addition, attacks against physical
infrastructure (e.g., Gulf oil tankers or refineries) or
cyber-attacks against sensitive commercial or financial
websites could have significant economic consequences
for the United States and its allies.
¡½¡½ Constraining U.S. freedom of action. Having
successfully deterred the United States from using
military force to prevent Iran¡¦s acquisition of nuclear
weapons, Tehran might feel empowered to use terrorism
as a means to deter other U.S. actions that it
opposes. Faced with credible Iranian terrorist threats,
U.S. officials might feel compelled to reconsider the
risks involved in taking actions that could provoke an
Iranian response, such as interdicting Iranian ships
suspected of carrying illicit materials; preventing
fuel supplies to Iranian aircraft;109 maintaining military
assistance to Egypt, Israel, or the Gulf states; or
engaging in military intervention in a place that Iran
deems objectionable.
¡½¡½ Diminishing confidence in U.S. ability to protect
allies. The continuing threat of terrorist attacks
against the United States could serve to diminish
confidence in U.S. leadership among U.S.
allies. If the United States is unable to prevent or
deter terrorist attacks against its own interests,
U.S. allies in the Gulf, Iraq, and elsewhere that are
even more vulnerable to potential Iranian attacks
would have little faith in U.S. security commitments
and guarantees. Such a result could further
intensify pressure among allies to accommodate a
nuclear-capable Iran.
to expand its use of terrorism. Following a terrorist
attack, U.S. military action to force a regime change,
for example, would almost certainly be off the table
(except perhaps in response to an Iranian attack using
weapons of mass destruction). Other potential forms
of retaliation, including a direct military attack on Iran,
could be risky, and in the absence of timely evidence
demonstrating clear Iranian involvement, U.S. retaliation
against a nuclear-capable Iran would be especially
unlikely.
Recent incidents indicate the difficulties of confronting
an unpredictable nuclear adversary. In 2008,
after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India refrained
from seriously considering conventional military
strikes against Pakistan because of the latter¡¦s nuclear
capability.107 Similarly, South Korea chose not to
respond to North Korean attacks against Yeonpyeong
island or the sinking of the Cheonin for fear of sparking
retaliation. To be sure, nuclear-armed states are
not immune from attack,108 and attacks against core
U.S. interests that could be traced directly back to Iran
would likely provoke some form of retaliation against
Iranian interests. But nuclear weapons, in the possession
of rogue regimes (e.g., the Soviet Union, China,
North Korea), have historically served as an effective
military deterrent.
The escalating risks of terrorism facilitated by a
nuclear-capable Iran could result in:
¡½¡½ Injury or death to American civilians and damage
to the U.S. economy. Successful terrorist
attacks targeting U.S. interests at home or abroad
could result in injury or death to significant numbers
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 23
4 | U.S. Policy Considerations
¡½¡½ A nuclear-capable Iran could help strengthen and
expand the Iran-led resistance front across the Middle
East¡Xraising its public stature and reinforcing
the expanding power and influence wielded by Tehran¡¦s
allies in key states, including Lebanon, the Palestinian
territories, and Iraq.
¡½¡½ By raising the risks and costs associated with potential
retaliatory strikes, a nuclear weapons capability
could allow Tehran to transfer increasingly
advanced weapons systems to its terrorist allies
in the Levant, enhancing their asymmetric capabilities
and, over time, eroding the overwhelming
military advantage thus far enjoyed by Israel. Iran
might also be prepared to transfer ballistic missiles
and sensitive nuclear technology to rogue regimes
around the world¡Xparticularly in Latin America¡X
that share its anti-American and anti-imperialist
worldview.
¡½¡½ A nuclear-ready Iran could limit U.S. freedom of
action in meaningful ways. Once Tehran crosses
the nuclear threshold, it will have gained a significant
instrument of leverage that could permanently
preclude certain U.S. options in dealing with Iran.
As a result, the United States could be forced to
tolerate greater acts of Iranian-sponsored violence
and terrorism in the Middle East and beyond.
¡½¡½ Deterrence and containment of a nuclear-ready
Iran could prove difficult, complicated, costly,
and potentially ineffective. With its own nuclear
deterrent and through the extension of security
guarantees, the United States might succeed in
deterring Iran¡¦s use of nuclear weapons, as well as
direct military aggression against its allies. But
forestalling increasingly lethal arms transfers, asymmetric
violence, intimidation, terrorism, and subversion¡X
all Iran¡¦s strengths¡Xcould pose a much
greater challenge.
On a visit to the Middle East in 2008, then
presidential candidate Barack Obama said that a
nuclear Iran would be a ¡§game-changing situation.¡¨110
Obama¡¦s comments focused on the potential cascade
of proliferation that might follow an Iranian nuclear
breakthrough. Such a cascade could lead to the unraveling
of the nuclear nonproliferation regime¡Xraising
serious risks of an unintended nuclear conflict in an
already volatile region.
But the scenarios discussed in this study suggest that
a nuclear Iran could have far broader consequences.
While the outcomes described by these scenarios are by
no means certain, or perhaps even likely, they illustrate
the risks and uncertainties facing the United States if
Iran were able to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
If any one of these outcomes were to result, it could
significantly complicate U.S. interests.
Given the Islamic Republic¡¦s far-reaching ambitions,
a nuclear weapons capability¡Xcoupled with its existing
hard and soft power assets¡Xcould have profound
implications:
¡½¡½ Iran does not appear to seek direct military confrontation
with its adversaries, and unless it faces
a direct and imminent threat to its survival, the
regime seems unlikely to attack an enemy using
nuclear weapons. Instead, Iran could seek to use a
nuclear capability in a manner consistent with its
longstanding pattern of behavior¡Xto demoralize
its adversaries through subtle intimidation and
power projection.111
¡½¡½ Perceived as a rising, hegemonic force in the region,
Iran could use a nuclear capability to enhance its
political leverage over its adversaries in the region.
Faced with subtle forms of intimidation, Iran¡¦s Gulf
neighbors, including Iraq, might feel increasingly
compelled to appease Tehran and accommodate its
interests in ways that could be detrimental to the
United States.
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
24 Policy Focus #114
efforts may be short-lived. Beyond this, containment
of Iran¡¦s nuclear activities will likely require increasingly
intrusive and politically difficult measures.
International sanctions on Iran¡¦s oil exports, for
example, could have a potentially crippling impact
on the Iranian economy, but garnering domestic
and diplomatic support for such an action will be a
heavy lift¡Xespecially while world leaders continue
to focus on recovering from the global economic
recession. At some point, the costs and risks of more
coercive options¡Xincluding military strikes against
Iranian nuclear facilities¡Xmay have to be weighed
against the costs and risks of allowing Iran to obtain
a nuclear capability, such as those illustrated by this
paper.
For the United States and its allies, preventing Iran
from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability must
remain a top priority. The Obama administration¡¦s
early attempts to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear
program have failed to bear fruit; indeed, it seemed
highly unlikely from the outset that Iran would be
willing to bargain away such a critical component
of its national security strategy. Despite four UN
Security Council resolutions, international sanctions
have not deterred Iran from moving forward on its
nuclear program. Moreover, Tehran appears to have
found ways to mitigate the impact of recent sabotage
efforts, including the Stuxnet virus that reportedly
targeted computers at Iranian nuclear facilities.
Ongoing sabotage operations could help delay
Iranian nuclear progress, but the results of such
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 25
5 | Conclusion
to provide weapons and support for its allies in the
Levant and dramatically reversing momentum gained
in recent years to expand the resistance front.
On the other hand, Iran¡¦s increasing openness with
regard to its nuclear program could reflect renewed
confidence as it nears the nuclear threshold. Iran has
defied the international community and continued its
enrichment activity¡Xincreasing its centrifuge capacity
and reaching higher levels of low-enriched uranium
than ever before. At the same time, it continues
to make progress on weaponization efforts, as well as
efforts to develop longer-range ballistic missiles that
could be capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Recent
Iranian statements about the nation¡¦s nuclear and military
advances could be designed to create an air of inevitably
about a nuclear-capable Iran, while at the same
time assuaging policymakers at home about potential
international retaliation.
Iran¡¦s acquisition of a nuclear capability is by no
means inevitable, and U.S. officials suggest that Tehran
is at least a year or more away from crossing this
threshold.114 But preventing this outcome demands
that the United States refocus its priorities on the Iranian
nuclear challenge and lead the international community
in forging more robust and coercive policy
options in the months ahead.
In recent weeks, statements and news accounts
out of Iran have been unusually forthright in characterizing
the regime¡¦s nuclear activities. While denying Iran
intends to develop nuclear weapons, Ahmadinezhad,
for example, recently declared that if Iran ¡§want[s] to
make a bomb, we are not afraid of anyone¡Kand no one
can do a damn thing.¡¨112 This statement followed an
article published on the website of an IRGC research
center bearing the title ¡§The Day after Iran¡¦s First
Nuclear Test Is a Normal Day¡¨ and setting forth hypothetical
news headlines describing a successful Iranian
nuclear weapons test. Further, the story suggested such
an event would create a ¡§sparkle of national pride and
strength.¡¨113
The motivation behind this unprecedented openness
is unclear. On the one hand, Iran could be attempting
to create distractions during what has been an especially
difficult period for the Islamic Republic and its
allies. Iran was forced to stand by idly as Saudi forces
suppressed Bahraini Shiites; the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon issued indictments against Hizballah members;
Hugo Chavez was forced to undergo treatment
for cancer; and Syria continues to struggle against an
unrelenting antiregime protest movement. The situation
in Syria represents a particularly worrisome development
for Tehran¡Xthe collapse of the Asad regime
would be a serious setback, undermining Iran¡¦s ability
26 Policy Focus #114
Notes
International Atomic Energy Agency, ¡§Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 1. and Relevant Provisions of
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,¡¨ May 24, 2011, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf; David Albright, ¡§IAEA Iran Safeguards Report,¡¨ Institute for Science and International
Security, May 24, 2011, http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_
Report_24May2011_Revised.pdf.
2. This includes former Central Intelligence Agency director Leon Panetta. See Peter Crail, ¡§U.S. Updates Iran Assessment,¡¨
Arms Control Association, March 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_03/Iran. Director of National
Intelligence Gen. James Clapper, in testimony to Congress, said the intelligence community believes Iran is ¡§keeping
open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to
produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. See Adam Entous, ¡§U.S. Spies: Iran Split on Nuclear Program,¡¨ Wall
Street Journal, February 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576148581167010572.
html.
3. ¡§Iran Secretly Tested ¡¥Nuclear-Capable Missiles,¡¦¡¨ Agence France-Presse, June 29, 2011, http://t.uani.com/j27xGL.
4. Washington Institute Presidential Task Force, Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian
Nuclear Progress (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2009), p. 2.
5. See Matt Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser, ¡§Would a Nuclear-Armed Iran Really Be So Dangerous?¡¨ Christian Science
Monitor, January 12, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0112/Would-a-nuclear-armed-
Iran-really-be-so-dangerous.
6. J. Lindsay and R. Takeyh, ¡§After Iran Gets the Bomb,¡¨ Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March 1, 2010), pp. 33¡V49.
7. See, for example, Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, ¡§Iran¡¦s Nuclear Challenge,¡¨ Political Science Quarterly 122, no. 2 (2007),
pp. 189¡V205.
8. See Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran¡¦s Most Powerful Leader (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf, p.
14. ¡§As Supreme Leader, Khamenei has tended to inherit and administer Khomeini¡¦s foreign policy positions rather
than break with the past and initiate his own approaches.¡¨
9. Ibid. See also Middle East Media Research Institute, ¡§Ahmadinejad: The Jews Only Seem Human...,¡¨ June 18, 2010,
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/4386.htm.
10. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ¡§¡¥The End of Capitalism¡¦: Transcript: Ahmadinejad Speech at UN General Assembly 9-23-
09,¡¨ World News Daily, September 24, 2009, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article23565.htm.
11. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ¡§Letter to President Bush,¡¨ published May 7, 2006, by the Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10633/letter_from_president_mahmoud_ahmadinejad_to_president_george_w_
bush.html.
12. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ¡§Full Text of Ahmadinejad¡¦s Speech at UN (9/11 Conspiracy),¡¨ published September 23,
2010, by Independent Media Review Analysis, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=49445.
13. Ahmadinejad, ¡§¡¥The End of Capitalism.¡¦¡¨
14. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, ¡§Speech at the 14th Summit of G-15,¡¨ May 24, 2010. Original posting unavailable; accessible
at http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread598360/pg1.
15. ¡§Ahmadinejad: Capitalism Nearing Its End,¡¨ PressTV, October 6, 2010, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/145461.html.
16. Karim Sadjadpour, ¡§Reading Khamenei: The Worldview of Iran¡¦s Most Powerful Leader¡¨ (Carnegie Foundation for
International Peace, 2008), p. 9.
17. ¡§Iran Hails World Financial Crisis as End of Capitalism,¡¨ Breitbart, October 15, 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.
php?id=081015152055.72llwkbo&show_article=1.
18. ¡§Leader Warns of Hijacking Uprisings,¡¨ PressTV, February 21, 2011, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/166309.html.
19. Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei, p. 3.
20. Ibid., p. 15.
21. Ibid.
22. Jeremy R. Hammond, ¡§Full Text of President Ahmadinejad¡¦s Remarks at UN Conference on Racism,¡¨ April 21, 2009,
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/04/21/full-text-of-president-ahmadinejads-remarks-at-un-conferenceon-
racism/.
23. ¡§Ahmadinejad Heralds Age of Light: ¡¥History¡¦s Unrivaled Arrogance Is about to Collapse,¡¦¡¨ PressTV, June 25, 2010, as
published in the MEMRI Iranian Media Blog, http://www.thememriblog.org/iran/blog_personal/en/28096.htm.
24. ¡§Iranian Leader: Wipe Out Israel,¡¨ CNN World, October 27, 2005, http://articles.cnn.com/2005-10-26/world/
ahmadinejad_1_israel-jerusalem-day-islamic-world?_s=PM:WORLD.
Notes Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 27
25. See also ¡§Kayhan: U.S. Is Collapsing Like U.S.S.R.,¡¨ editorial, June 2, 2010, as published in the MEMRI Iranian Media
Blog, http://www.thememriblog.org/iran/blog_personal/en/27455.htm.
26. ¡§Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Mocks Obama¡¦s ¡¥Cowboy¡¦ Nuclear Plan,¡¨ New York Daily News, April 7,
2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-04-07/news/27061121_1_uranium-enrichment-nuclear-weapons-nuclearprogram.
27. Ahmadinejad, ¡§¡¥The End of Capitalism.¡¦¡¨
28. Middle East Media Research Institute, ¡§Ahmadinejad: The Jews Only Seem Human...¡¨
29. Ahmadinejad, ¡§¡¥The End of Capitalism.¡¦¡¨
30. Ibid.
31. Spengler (pen name), ¡§When Even the Pope Has to Whisper,¡¨ Asia Times, January 10, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/Middle_East/HA10Ak01.html.
32. ¡§Brazil and Iran Call for New Economic Order,¡¨ Latin American Herald Tribune, May 16, 2010, http://laht.com/article.
asp?ArticleId=357008&CategoryId=10718.
33. Hammond, ¡§Full Text of President Ahmadinejad¡¦s Remarks.¡¨
34. Y. Mansharof and I. Rapoport, ¡§Tension in Iran-Bahrain Relations after Kayhan Editor Claims Bahrain Is Inseparable Part
of Iran,¡¨ Middle East Media Research Institute, August 3, 2007, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2314.
htm.
35. Preamble of the Iranian constitution. See http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html.
36. ¡§Iran Proposes Gulf Pact with Persian Gulf States,¡¨ Agence France-Presse, November 9, 2006, http://www.defence.pk/
forums/world-affairs/2802-iran-proposes-defense-pact-gulf-states.html.
37. ¡§MEMRI: Reactions in the Gulf to Tension over Iranian Nuclear Issue,¡¨ April 8, 2010, Independent Media Review
Analysis, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=47686.
38. ¡§Iran Ready to Offer Military Aid to Lebanon,¡¨ Now Lebanon, August 25, 2010, http://www.nowlebanon.com/News-
ArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=196579.
39. Richard Spencer, ¡§Iran Tells Iraqi Prime Minister ¡¥Get Rid of America,¡¦¡¨ Telegraph, October 18, 2010, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/8071242/Iran-tells-Iraqi-prime-minister-get-rid-of-America.html.
40. George Semaan, ¡§Ahmadinejad in Lebanon¡K¡¥A Welcomed Visit,¡¦¡¨ Dar al-Hayat, October 18, 2010, http://www.daralhayat.
com/portalarticlendah/193282.
41. ¡§Iranian Official: Iran¡¦s Support for Iraqi [sic] Is Strategic,¡¨ MEMRI Blog, July 25, 2010, http://www.thememriblog.org/
blog_personal/en/28842.htm.
42. Karim Sajadpour, Reading Khamenei. The Palestinian issue ¡§does not resonate strongly on the Iranian street¡XIran is
not Arab, has no land or border disputes with Israel, has no Palestinian refugee problem, and possesses the largest Jewish
community in the Middle East outside of Israel.¡¨
43. Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, in response to questions from the public, January 2, 2006, as cited by the Anti-Defamation
League, http://www.adl.org/main_International_Affairs/ahmadinejad_words.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_7.
44. Hammond, ¡§Full Text of President Ahmadinejad¡¦s Remarks.¡¨
45. Gholam Ali Adel, as quoted in Iran¡¦s Race for Regional Supremacy: Strategic Implications for the Middle East ( Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, June 20, 2008), p. 49, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LN
GID=1&TMID=84&FID=452&PID=2280.
46. David G. Littman, ¡§Hezbollah¡¦s Calls for Genocide,¡¨ FrontPage, August 14, 2006, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/
readArticle.aspx?ARTID=3100.
47. ¡§In Beirut, Iranian President Ahmadinejad Reiterates 9/11 Conspiracy, Accuses the West in al-Hariri Assassination,¡¨
Middle East Media Research Institute, October 13, 2010, http://m.memri.org/14499/show/f26d11b8c743209ec439fb
ef78773932&t=20320d97cb30b6845cb6422bedb5dfbe.
48. Khamenei, speech to judiciary officials, June 28, 2005, as quoted in Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei.
49. ¡§¡¥Today the World Is on the Brink of a Great Change¡K,¡¨ Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memritv.
org/report/en/print4681.htm. This Ahmadinezhad speech aired October 13, 2010, on the Islamic Republic of Iran
News Network (IRINN).
50. Ryan Crocker, as quoted in David Ignatius, ¡§Jousting with Iran,¡¨ Washington Post, November 7, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507629.html.
51. Dennis Blair, ¡§Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,¡¨
prepared remarks, February 2, 2010, p. 14, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf.
52. Lauren Gelfand and Alon Ben-David, ¡§New Missile Marks ¡¥Significant Leap¡¦ for Iran Capabilities,¡¨ IHS Jane¡¦s Defense
& Security Intelligence & Analysis, November 14, 2008, http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.
aspx?ID=1065927438&pu=1&rd=janes_com.
53. U.S. Department of Defense, ¡§Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,¡¨ congressionally directed action (April
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
28 Policy Focus #114
2010).
54. Ibid.
55. Joby Warrick, ¡§U.S. Accuses Iran of Aiding al-Qaeda,¡¨ Washington Post, July 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/us-accuses-iran-of-aiding-al-qaeda/2011/07/28/gIQARUPxfI_story.html.
56. Ethan Chorin and Haim Malka, ¡§Iran¡¦s Soft Power Creates Hard Realities,¡¨ Center for Strategic and International Studies,
April 2008.
57. Karim Sadjadpour, ¡§The Supreme Leader,¡¨ Iran Primer, U.S. Institute of Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/
supreme-leader.
58. ¡§Ahmadinejad Stops in Syria on Way to UN,¡¨ Fox News, September 18, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/
world/2010/09/18/way-irans-president-stops-syria-talks-ally-standoff-west/#ixzz1RM5Qp2Ge.
59. ¡§Assad, Ahmadinejad Reaffirm Ties,¡¨ Gulf Times, October 3, 2010, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/printArticle.
asp?cu_no=2&item_no=389643&version=1&template_id=37&parent_id=17.
60. ¡§Chavez and Ahmadinejad Say United to Change World Order,¡¨ Reuters, October 20, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2010/10/20/us-iran-venezuela-idUSTRE69J53A20101020.
61. Michael Eisenstadt and Mehdi Khalaji, Nuclear Fatwa: Religion, Culture, and Iran¡¦s Strategic Doctrine (Washington,
D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, forthcoming).
62. ¡§Lessons from North Korea,¡¨ Kayhan, October 12, 2006, as cited in ¡§Iranian Daily Close to Supreme Leader Khamenei¡K,¡¨
Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1907.htm.
63. As former CIA director Michael Hayden has suggested, Iran appears to be ¡§getting itself to that step right below a
nuclear weapon, that permanent breakout stage,¡¨ allowing the regime to enjoy the benefits of being perceived as a
nuclear power but without having to pay the full price of membership in the nuclear club. See Yoel Guzansky, ¡§Teheran¡¦s
¡¥Break-Out¡¦ Option,¡¨ Jerusalem Post, August 4, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.
aspx?id=183670.
64. E. Edelman, A. Krepinevich, and E. Montgomery, ¡§The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment,¡¨ Foreign
Affairs 90, no. 1 ( January¡VFebruary 2011), p. 68, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelmanandrew-
f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran.
65. Other possible scenarios focus on the risks of unintentional conflict and escalation, regime loss of control over nuclear
material, and nuclear accidents. While these possibilities merit further analysis, such discussion is beyond the scope of
this paper.
66. See Ian Black and Simon Tisdall, ¡§Saudi Arabia Urges U.S. Attack on Iran to Stop Nuclear Programme,¡¨ Guardian,
November 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran.
67. Gulf states have often sought to ¡§blend confrontational policies toward Iran with elements of conciliation, engagement,
and accommodation. See Dalia Kaye and Frederic Wehrey, ¡§Containing Iran? Avoiding a Two-Dimensional Strategy in
a Four-Dimensional Region,¡¨ Washington Quarterly ( July 2009), p. 38.
68. This includes the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, CENTCOM¡¦s forward operating base and air force base in Qatar, army bases
in Kuwait, naval and air facilities in the UAE, and naval facilities in Oman. See ¡§Mideast Unrest Putting U.S. Military
Access in Jeopardy,¡¨ Kuwait Times, February 20, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hBg0
UCyeqnZzFymKzGQSqctNi82Q?docId=CNG.152f8947ca6447e697fff35e7e7d6f49.241.
69. Faced with Iraqi threats, Gulf states denied the United States access to bases for Operation Desert Strike, the 1996 effort
against advancing Iraqi forces in northern Iraq. Following the Khobar Towers attack, the United States reduced its military
footprint in Saudi Arabia, and after the September 11 attacks it pulled out nearly all remaining troops.
70. As noted by David Aaron of the RAND Corporation, ¡§[T]he network [of American Gulf bases] is a crucial linchpin
for American military power,¡¨ and the erosion of this network would represent a ¡§blow to our ability to deter Iran.¡¨ See
¡§Mideast Unrest,¡¨ Kuwait Times.
71. From 2002 to 2008, the four largest Gulf contributors to the PA were Saudi Arabia with $560.9 million, Algeria with
$273.3 million, the UAE with $258.9 million, and Qatar with $232.7 million. See ¡§Falling Short¡¨ (graphic), Washington
Post, July 27, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2008/07/27/GR2008072700095.
html?sid=ST2008072700226.
72. See Mitchell Reiss, ¡§A Nuclear-Armed Iran: Possible Security and Diplomatic Implications,¡¨ Council on Foreign Relations,
May 2010. See also Michael Makovsky and Lawrence Goldstein, ¡§Iran, Oil, and the Carter Doctrine,¡¨ Weekly
Standard, August 13, 2010, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/iran-oil-and-carter-doctrine.
73. Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali, Iran¡¦s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran¡¦s Whole-of-Government
Approach, Policy Focus no. 111 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2011), pp. 7¡V9.
74. U.S. Department of Defense, ¡§Unclassified Report,¡¨ p. 3.
75. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), through 2010, the United States has spent $709 billion on
Notes Ash Jain
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 29
military operations, economic aid, diplomatic operations, indigenous security forces, and other services in Iraq. See The
Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO (August 2010), p. 15. In addition, nearly 4,500 U.S. military personnel
have lost their lives since the war began. See, for example, http://icasualties.org/.
See Fred Kagan, ¡§Iraq Threat Assessment: The Dangers to the United States, I 76. raq, and Mideast Stability of Abandoning
Iraq at the End of 2011,¡¨ American Enterprise Institute, May 24, 2011.
77. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, ¡§Iranian Support of Hamas,¡¨ Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration
Center, January 12, 2008, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/
iran_e004.pdf.
78. Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly expressed concern about an Iranian nuclear umbrella over Hizballah and Hamas.
See Jeffrey Goldberg, ¡§The Point of No Return,¡¨ The Atlantic, September 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2010/09/the-point-of-no-return/8186/4/.
79. For further discussion, see Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Iran with Nuclear Weapons: Anticipating the Consequences
for U.S. Policy (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, September 2008).
80. See Barry R. Posen, Barry Rubin, James M. Lindsay, and Ray Takeyh, ¡§The Containment Conundrum: How Dangerous
Is a Nuclear Iran?¡¨ Foreign Affairs 89, no. 4 ( July¡VAugust 2010), pp. 160¡V168. See also Dima Adamsky et al., ¡§The
War over Containing Iran: Can a Nuclear Iran Be Stopped?, Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March¡VApril 2011), pp. 155¡V168:
¡§Even vague statements of Iranian support for its allies might be interpreted as confirmation of a nuclear umbrella, and
therefore cause Iran¡¦s proxies to behave as if backed by an Iranian commitment.¡¨
81. ¡§Hizbullah Admits Receiving Syrian Scuds,¡¨ Jerusalem Post, April 15, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.
aspx?id=173217; Andrew Lee Butters, ¡§Syrian Saber-Rattling Has U.S. Concerned,¡¨ Time, April 15, 2010, http://www.
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1981955,00.html.
82. Adamsky et al., ¡§The War over Containing Iran.¡¨
83. In a simulation conducted by the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center that assumed a nuclear-armed Iran, Israel was
deterred from taking military action against Hizballah when faced by missile attacks against Tel Aviv and a transfer by
Iran of radioactive material. See ¡§Israel Plays War Game Assuming Iran Has Nuclear Bomb,¡¨ ArabNews.com, May 18,
2010, http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article54746.ece.
84. See also Jeffrey White, ¡§If War Comes: Israel vs. Hizballah and Its Allies,¡¨ Policy Focus no. 106 (Washington, D.C.:
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 2010), p. 3.
85. See Adamsky et al., ¡§The War over Containing Iran.¡¨
86. ¡§Chavez in Iran for Talks to Expand Oil, Gas Cooperation,¡¨ Jerusalem Post, October 19, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/
International/Article.aspx?id=191951.
87. ¡§Iran and Venezuela Agreed on Need for Global Changes towards Justice,¡¨ Islamic Republic News Agency, October 21,
2010, http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30031500&SRCH=1.
88. U.S. Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau, ¡§The Link between Iran and Venezuela: A Crisis in the Making?¡¨ remarks at the
Brookings Institution, September 8, 2009, http://www.gfip.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25
7&Itemid=74.
89. U.S. Department of Defense, ¡§Unclassified Report.¡¨
90. ¡§WikiLeaks: U.S. Believes Iran Shipping UAVs to Venezuela via Turkey,¡¨ Latin American Herald Tribune, n.d., http://
www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=380783&CategoryId=10717.
91. See U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, p. 189, and ¡§Iran Establishes Direct Shipping Route
to Venezuela,¡¨ Tehran Times, October 13, 2008, https://www.zawya.com/marketing.cfm?zp&p=/story.cfm/
sidZAWYA20081013045354/ir/_establishes_shipping_route_to_Venezuela?cc.
92. ¡§U.S. Treasury Designates Two Venezuelan Men as Hezbollah Supporters,¡¨ Anti-Defamation League, June 24, 2008,
http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/venezuela_hezbollah_supporters.htm.
93. According to former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs Roger Noriega, Chavez reportedly
hosted a secret summit in August 2010 that included Hamas political chief Khaled Mashal, Palestinian Islamic Jihad
secretary-general Ramadan Shallah, and Hizballah¡¦s chief of operations. See Noriega, ¡§Is There a Chavez Terror Network
on America¡¦s Doorstep?¡¨ Washington Post, March 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-therea-
chavez-terror-network-on-americas-doorstep/2011/03/18/ABauYU3_story.html; see also ¡§Kuwaitis among Trainees
in ¡¥Guards¡¦ Latin Camp,¡¨ Arab Times, April 28, 2011, http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/
smid/414/ArticleID/168534/reftab/36/Default.aspx.
94. Bret Stephens, ¡§The Tehran-Caracas Nuclear Axis,¡¨ Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704869304574595652815802722.html; Roger Noriega, ¡§Infected by VIRUS: The Threat
of the Venezuela-Iran-Russia-Syria Nexus,¡¨ remarks at the Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2010, http://www.heritage.
org/Events/2010/11/VIRUS; the suggestion here is that such cooperation may have a ¡§military application.¡¨
Ash Jain Nuclear Weapons and Iran¡¦s Global Ambitions
30 Policy Focus #114
Simon Romero, ¡§Venezuela Says Iran Is Helping It 95. Look for Uranium,¡¨ New York Times, September 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/09/26/world/americas/26venez.html.
96. ¡§Chavez Eyes Russia Nuclear Help,¡¨ BBC News, September 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7641168.stm. See also Cynthia J.
Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, Iran in Latin America: Threat or ¡§Axis of Annoyance,¡¨ Reports on the Americas no. 23
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009), p. 3.
97. ¡§Hugo Chavez Calls Off Venezuela¡¦s Nuclear Energy Plans,¡¨ BBC News, March 17, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latinamerica-
12768148.
98. In fact, members of a Hizballah cell arrested in Charlotte, North Carolina, in 2000 had used Venezuela as a transit point for ultimate
entry to the United States. See David E. Kaplan, ¡§Homegrown Terrorists: How a Hezbollah Cell Made Millions in Sleepy Charlotte,
N.C.,¡¨ U.S. News & World Report, March 2, 2003, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/030310/10hez.htm.
99. A recent German press report suggested that Iran may already be laying the groundwork for a potential transfer of Iranian Shahab-3,
Scud B, and Scud C ballistic missiles to Venezuela. See C. Wergin and H. Stausberg, ¡§Caracas-Tehran Axis: Iran Plans to Build a
Missile Base in Venezuela¡¨ (in German), Welt Online, November 25, 2010, http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article11219574/Iranplant-
Bau-einer-Raketenstellung-in-Venezuela.html. U.S. State Department officials, however, have dismissed the report¡¦s credibility;
¡§U.S. Knocks Down Report of Iran, Venezuela Missile Base,¡¨ CNN World, May 21, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-21/world/
venezuela.iran.missiles_1_missile-base-report-bolivarian-revolution?_s=PM:WORLD.
100. For an analysis of why states may seek to transfer nuclear materials, see Matthew Kroenig, ¡§Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide
Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,¡¨ American Political Science Review 103, no. 1 (February 2009). This piece concluded, based on empirical
data, that a shared common enemy can be a strong incentive for states to transfer such technology.
101. See Arnson et al., Iran in Latin America.
102. ¡§Bolivia, Iran Seek Closer Military Ties,¡¨ United Press International, November 1, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-
Industry/2010/11/01/Bolivia-Iran-seek-closer-military-ties/UPI-91781288637055/; ¡§Bolivia-Iran Foreign Relations,¡¨ American
Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, August 4, 2010, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/bolivia-iran-foreign-relations.
103. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2004), pp. 47¡V70.
104. U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, p. 192.
105. U.S. Department of Defense, ¡§Unclassified Report.¡¨
106. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
107. A former Indian Army chief of staff, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury, stated bluntly that Pakistan¡¦s nuclear threat had deterred India
from seriously considering conventional military strikes. See Vipin Narang, ¡§Pakistan¡¦s Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian
Stability,¡¨ Policy Brief (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/
19889/pakistans_nuclear_posture.html.
108. Argentina, for example, challenged British control of the Falkland Islands in 1982.
109. A recent editorial in Kayhan has called for attacks against U.S. and European airline offices for their refusal to supply fuel to Iranian
aircraft. See http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Iranian-hardliner-says-US-Europe-need-lesson-1471771.php.
110. Jeff Zeleny, ¡§Obama Meets with Israeli and Palestinian Leaders,¡¨ New York Times, July 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/
us/politics/24obama.html.
111. See Michael Eisenstadt, ¡§Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran,¡¨ testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services,
February 1, 2006, http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=279.
112. ¡§Ahmadinejad Insists Iran Not Seeking Nuclear Bomb,¡¨ Agence France-Presse, June 23, 2011, http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/
afp/20110623/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpoliticsahmadinejad.
113. ¡§IRGC Website on the Day After Iran¡¦s First Nuclear Test,¡¨ as posted July 6, 2011, in New Middle East News, http://nmen.org/irgcwebsite-
on-the-day-after-irans-first-nuclear-test/.
114. See Joby Warrick, ¡§Iran Touts Major Advances in Nuclear Program,¡¨ Washington Post, April 11, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/iran-touts-major-advances-in-nuclear-program/2011/04/11/AFZ8cxMD_story.html. See also Mark Fitzpatrick, Iran¡¦s
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 3, 2011),
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/irans-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-capabilities/press-statement/.
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